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FOREWORD
There is no doubt that the events of 9/11 forever changed the way transportation
professionals implement security measures not only at airports, but also in
heavily-trafficked (and difficult to secure) rail and subway stations, bus terminals, and
within the vehicles themselves.
A great deal of expertise has gone into studying and predicting terrorist behavior in
surface transportation. I am proud that the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) has
been on the leading edge of this research, long before 9/11, with a symposium on
terrorism in surface transportation. This was hosted at San José State University (SJSU)
in 1996. Further, MTI published Brian Michael Jenkins’ report, Protecting Surface
Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities, in December 1997. A few
weeks after 9/11, MTI mobilized and hosted a National Transportation Security Summit
on October 30, 2001 in Washington DC. That same month, MTI also released the third in
a series of publications examining best security practices in surface
transportation—Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious
Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices by Brian Jenkins and Larry
Gersten.
In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security named MTI as a National Transportation
Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE), with noted counterterrorism expert Brian
Michael Jenkins at the helm as director. With this transportation security function, MTI
will provide research support in developing new technologies, tools and advanced
methods to defend, protect, and increase the resilience of the United States’ multimodal
transportation infrastructure. In the coming months, MTI’s NTSCOE will contribute to the
study of counterterrorism measures with updated publications and case studies.
This publication is an edited transcript of the Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Summit, which was co-sponsored by MTI and the American Public Transportation
Association in Chicago, Illinois on June 18, 2009, during APTA’s annual Rail Conference.
I would like to thank the principal presenters at this event, including Brian Jenkins, Bruce
Butterworth, and John Sammon. Panelists Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana, Jesus Ojeda,
Ed Phillips and Dave Schlesinger provided a great deal of information to the workshop
attendees. And indeed, the workshop attendees themselves added much to the
dialogue.
Thanks also to Greg Hull and APTA for their ongoing support.
Finally, I offer my congratulations to MTI’s Director of Communications and ITT, Donna
Maurillo, for making this Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit such a successful
teaching and learning event.

Rod Diridon, Sr.
Executive Director, MTI
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 1993 and 9/11 attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center forever changed the
way transportation professionals in the United States implement security measures, not
only in airports, but also for all surface transportation modalities, including bus and
railway stations, and also the vehicles themselves, all of which are prime targets for
terrorism. Further attacks on rail systems in Madrid, London and Mumbai, among
others, have provided researchers with plenty of raw data for study.
This e-publication is an edited record of a special Rail Passenger Selective Screening
Summit which was held on June 17, 2009 as part of the American Public Transportation
Association’s annual rail conference, which was held in Chicago, Illinois, and
co-sponsored by the Mineta Transportation Institute and APTA. The interactive workshop
brought together experts in the transportation security industry and security practitioners
who are “out in the trenches” providing rail security for systems of various sizes and
varieties, from light rail to heavy commuter rail to Amtrak.
The event’s principal presenters were Brian Michael Jenkins, director of the National
Transportation Center of Excellence at MTI, and Bruce Butterworth, co-author of the MTI
publication, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers. The pair is in the process of
updating their previous publications on terrorism and creating a searchable database
which will contain a chronology of attacks on surface transportation systems.
Other presenters included Paul MacMillan, chief of police, Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority Police Department; Ron Masciana, deputy chief, Metropolitan
Transit Authority (MTA), New York; Ed Phillips, operations deputy, Office of Security,
Amtrak; Dave Schlesinger, course manager, Transportation Safety Institute; and Jesus
Ojeda, security coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail Authority.
Topics of discussion included an overview of security best practices, selective screening
techniques, security staff training, legal issues, funding challenges and establishing
agency policy and procedures.
This publication has had sensitive and identifying material, such as specific agency
names and brand names, removed to ensure agency privacy and security.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS AND BRUCE BUTTERWORTH:
RAIL PASSENGER SELECTIVE SCREENING
GREG HULL
The American Public Transportation Association has had a longstanding relationship
with the Mineta Transportation Institute, and we’ve partnered with MTI in a number of
areas. Certainly, as MTI has taken on a leading role in the areas of security, research and
policies, we have worked closely in those areas as well. Quite often, in fact, as we are
citing information, and even in our testimonies that we give to Congress, it’s work coming
out of MTI that enables us to speak credibly of the status of security and countering
terrorism, particularly in our industry, public transportation. We certainly thank MTI for all
of the good work that they’re engaged in
I had the opportunity to get caught up on some of the projects and publications from MTI
that we can anticipate being made available to us in the coming months, and I'm very
excited to be the recipient of those products.
I’ve worked very closely over the past several years with both Brian Michael Jenkins and
Bruce Butterworth. I have participated in forums and have had the opportunity to join
them in providing support for some of their activities, and I’m sure that what you’re going
to hear today, through the group that’s been brought together, you will come away more
enlightened and better informed in these areas that we’re going to be addressing with
respect to policies on conducting of searches. So, on behalf of APTA, welcome.
BRIAN M. JENKINS
Thank you very much, Greg.
I am Brian Jenkins and I direct the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
(NTSCOE) at the Mineta Transportation Institute. The Mineta Transportation Institute has
been involved in research on surface transportation security since 1996. Since 1991,
MTI has been one of the centers of research sponsored by the Department of
Transportation. In 2007, the Mineta Transportation Institute was selected by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as one of the centers of excellence. Although
our budget remains tight, this support does allow us to not only continue our work, but to
create jointly-funded projects that bridge DOT and DHS concerns. It certainly has
increased the workflow for the NTSCOE, which is the entity within MTI that addresses
security.
Greg Hull mentioned some of the things that we are working on. Today we are going to
be talking about selective screening: one of the reports that we have scheduled for this
year includes overall trends in attacks on surface-transportation systems. More than ten
years ago, MTI was one of the first organizations to create a chronology of attacks on
surface transportation systems. Now we are going to take that information—what was
essentially a narrative set of entries—and digitize it. We’re in the process of doing that
now, to turn that information into a much more powerful research tool so that we can
examine the trends.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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One of the things that we’ve been specifically asked by the Department of Homeland
Security to do is to provide research support to their counter-IED (improvised explosive
device). We will be producing a report that is looking at the use of improvised explosive
devices by terrorists against surface transportation targets, but in great detail—looking at
the types of devices, at the placement of devices, trends over time, where in the systems
the greatest casualties occur when these events take place. That report will be coming
out later this year. We also have several case studies coming out. Overall there are
about seven or eight major reports that will be coming out this year.
In addition to the research reports, we have been doing these summits. To me, “summit”
is a high-fallutin’ term. Greg’s got the right idea—these are workshops and really ought
not to be perceived only as us presenting information to you, because there is as much
experience on your side of the podium as there is on my side. These are very informal
sessions, and we’re going to be inviting comments and discussion as much as we are
presenting the results of our research.
The process of these summits formally began in 2001. There had been earlier
conferences, but right after 9/11, then-Secretary of Transportation Norm Mineta said, “I
want to pull together all the operators of surface transportation systems. W.e need to
bring them up-to-date on terrorist threats, what DOT is going to do about it, and how
we're going to address this.”
MTI was able to put that together within three weeks of 9/11. That's because we already
had five or six years of research under our belts. That enabled us to respond quickly.
Since then, these symposiums have become regular features of our work. They are
workshops, and we use them to introduce new research and elicit views through
discussions, which, in turn, we incorporate not only in a report on the meeting itself, but
bring back into the final report as we write that. So you are all actually enlisted in a
peer-review process as we go along. We're not going to be handing out a report today,
but we are going to make the edited proceedings available.
We'll start off today with a discussion of our recent research on selective screening. Then
we have assembled a five-member panel. We actually have about a century and a half of
transportation security experience on the panel itself. I'll introduce the members of that
panel after the break.
Then at lunch, John Sammon from TSA will be joining us to say a few words. After lunch,
we'll continue the discussion for as long as we want to. We're scheduled to break up at
three.
I’m going to introduce what we’ve done at MTI and talk about some of the broad issues
of selective screening, and some of the issues of implementation. Then I’m going to turn
things over to Bruce, who will describe some of the components of these selective
screening systems, and then I’m going to come back and talk about some of the
operations, some of the lessons learned, and then we’ll take a break and come back with
our panel.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Review of Selective Passenger
Screening in Mass Transit:
Preliminary Observations
Mineta Transportation Institute
National Transportation Security
Center

June 18, 2009

1

The subject of selective screening is a little bit like plutonium. It’s a security measure that
doesn’t go down easy, and as you all understand, there’s a lot of sensitivity about this
particular issue. Several years ago, MTI took on the task of looking at the issue of
selective screening, and in 2007, produced a report (Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce
Butterworth, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers, MTI Report 06-07) based on
research conducted in 2006. I’ll be talking about the background and implementation
decisions. Bruce Butterworth will then talk about components. Then I'll conclude with
lessons learned, best practices, and some issues for discussion.
I want to bring to your attention another report that was put out by Stephan A. Parker
through the TCRP (Transit Cooperative Research Program). Public Transportations
Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers. It is an excellent
report that also deals with screening and is a guide for policy and decision-making.
TCRP has an array of products and reports which are valuable, and a monthly status
report of what is ongoing and what is about to come out. I have got copies here available
for people who want it.
In our 2007 MTI report, Bruce and I asked what we thought were the key questions at the
time. Clearly, 100 percent passenger screening for surface transportation simply wasn’t
realistic. Applying the commercial aviation model wasn’t going to work here, for a variety
of reasons—volume of passengers, the number of screeners that would be required if
screening were increased, the number of boardings of people that would have to be
screened. The cost would be enormous. Waiting in line 15 minutes or in some cases, 30
minutes, to board a plane to fly across the country is acceptable. If you’re going to take a
25-minute subway ride, waiting 15 or 20 minutes in a security line is not acceptable. So
the question was, “If 100 percent screening is not going to work, do selective searches
work? Is it an option?”
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

8

Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening

2007 MTI Report
• In February 2007, MTI published report based on
research initiated in January 2006.
• Public report entitled: “Selective Screening of Rail
Passengers”
• Report addressed key questions:
1. If 100 percent screening is not possible, do selective searches
make sense?
2. If only some passengers are screened, where there is no
specific intelligence, what should be the appropriate selection
process?
3. What combinations of selection methods are appropriate under
different conditions?
4. What role can current and future technology play in passenger
screening?
5. What are the characteristics of a good screening program

June 18, 2009

4

If only some passengers are to be screened where there is no specific intelligence, then
what selection methods or combination of selection methods, under different conditions,
might be appropriate? How do you do the selection process?
We also wanted to take a look at technology in our 2007 report, what was available at the
time, what was on the drawing boards, what was on the horizon, in terms of availability of
technology that would affect passenger screening. And we wanted to ask, “What would
be the ingredients of what we’d call a good selection program?
We concluded that 100 percent screening was not an option; but certainly, there were
circumstances where selective screening would, and did, make sense.
For example, there might be a situation where there would be an alert, or where an
attack had occurred on a system, and we were worried about copycats or other
components of the original attack that we weren’t yet aware of.
Therefore, among the security measures that could be rapidly implemented or increased,
selective screening offered a flexible response. When we talk about selective screening,
we have to talk about it in terms of risk reduction, not the prevention of all attacks.
With commercial aviation security, you’re really talking about prevention—you’re going
for 100 percent prevention. When we talk about selective screening, we're not talking
about absolute prevention. We're talking about deterrence. We’re talking about
complicating the task of the bad guys, talking about moving them away from some of
their preferred targets to some less-lucrative targets. We are talking about risk reduction.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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2007 Report Conclusions
• Screening 100 percent of urban mass transit passengers
is not a realistic security option, but that…
• Terrorism alerts on transportation targets may dictate
that security measures be rapidly increased, and that
selective screening offers a flexible response.
• The goal of any security measure is risk reduction, not
the prevention of all attacks.
• Selective searches can contribute to deterrence, oblige
terrorists to take greater risks, complicate their planning,
force them to use smaller quantities of explosives, and
divert them to less lucrative targets.
June 18, 2009

• Full technological solutions are years away.

5

There is historical support for risk reduction. One of the case studies that we did years
ago of the IRA bombing campaign showed just that. This was good campaign to study; it
ran 25 years, therefore it gives us lots of data so that we can see how terrorists
responded to things. They were going after very lucrative targets like Victoria Station and
other locations in the heart of London.
As the authorities began to implement security measures, the IRA attacks began to focus
on the stations in the suburbs, and as the authorities spread those security measures
further out, the IRA was ultimately reduced to carrying out attacks on signal boxes and
remote stations. The measures didn’t end the terrorism campaign, but it did reduce the
risk by reducing their return on investment in terms of casualties. Now that changed in a
different environment when terrorists went to suicide bombers, but at least it raised the
threshold, indicating that a particular regime of security works unless somebody is willing
to commit suicide.
Overall, we were able to say that selective searches can contribute to deterrence. They
oblige the terrorists to take greater risks. Screening complicates their planning.
Screening may force terrorists to use smaller quantities of explosives. They may divert to
less lucrative targets.
JOHN MC PARTLAND
If you were to try to do something like that in the state of California, the first thing that’s
going to jump up is, “What's the criteria you’re using for that random selection?” and
“You're profiling me and my friends.”

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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BRIAN JENKINS
You bet. And we will come to that, but that indeed is the tricky part—How do you do the
selection?
We’ve looked—are there any technological silver bullets out there? No, not really. I mean
there is some interesting technology and there are some good things being done by DHS
Science and Technology, but we don’t have a silver bullet yet.

Report Conclusions (con’t)
•

Selective searches run against Americans’ preference for security that
is passive and egalitarian, and therefore must be carefully planned
and closely managed to reduce the inevitable allegations of
discrimination and profiling based upon race or ethnicity.

•

A good selection process must be
–
–
–
–
–
–

•

Planned in advance
Based on clear policies and procedures
Combine random selection, behavioral profiling, and threat information
Maximize unpredictability
Allow for expansion, redeployment, and reduction
Maximize interaction with riders, but not in a way that is perceived as
harassment.

Vigorous public information programs must accompany the
introduction of any new security measure that directly engages riders,
to alley potential public concerns.

June 18, 2009
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Selective screening runs directly contrary to an American preference for security that is
non-intrusive, passive and that is egalitarian. We want to see everybody treated exactly
the same way.
And that’s the tricky part. Clearly, one of the challenges is that you do have to reduce the
inevitable allegations of discrimination and profiling based upon race or ethnicity. To
answer your question directly, there are three bases for selecting someone for screening.
One is a truly mathematically random selection. That is, a police chief at the beginning of
the day says, “It’s going to be every seventh or every thirteenth passenger.” It's
numerically generated. Some of the departments do it in different ways, and Bruce will
get into these different ways of assuring randomness. But it’s mathematically driven.
Some agencies actually have little random number generators.
A second criterion is some aspect of observed behavior or clothing. In other words, it
would be legitimate to say, “We’re not simply going to inspect every seventh person.
We’re going to inspect every seventh person that is carrying a parcel, backpack, suitcase
or bag of a certain size.” You can use those two in combination.
A third criterion—which is a rare one—would be if you have specific intelligence that tells
you that should be looking for a specific person or group. Clearly, race or ethnicity would
not only be inappropriate, given our society. It would also be poor security. If you ask me,

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening

11

and I’ve been involved in research on terrorism for a number of years—what does a
terrorist look like? I would be hard-pressed to tell you.
The youngest terrorist that I know about that carried out a successful suicide bombing,
killing the prime minister of India, was 12 years old. The oldest was 73. Males and
females have carried out attacks. In our diverse society, it would be stupid to have a
security system based upon a profile. Bruce will come back to this.
A good selection process must be planned in advance. This is not something you do ad
hoc, but you have to have very clear policies and procedures. You can combine selection
methods. You can combine random selection with behavioral profiling and specific threat
information. You want to maximize the unpredictability of it, and you want something that
you can expand, move around, or reduce, depending on the situation. So you want a
very flexible platform for this thing. You want something that maximizes interaction,
because frequently, it's not just the inspection—it’s the interaction that accompanies it.
You have to have a vigorous public information program to explain to people what you
are doing and to allay some of the inevitable suspicions. These are going to vary in
different parts of the country.

DHS Requests Update
•

2008: DHS asked MTI as a COE to update study

•

Task:
– Review all selective screening programs in mass transit systems
implemented as a continuing or temporary measure
– Draft supplement for DHS review and for dissemination to industry
leaders
– NOTE: MTI also took the initiative to interview transit agencies that had
decided not to implement such a program

•

Team:
– Brian Michael Jenkins, PI
– Bruce R. Butterworth, Research Associate
– Larry N. Gerston, Research Associate

June 18, 2009
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In 2008, we were asked by the Department of Homeland Security if we would update our
2006 study. Several years had passed since we did the study. We wanted to see what
lessons had been learned from the systems that were in place and operating. We also
were curious about those specific decisions where operators or authorities said, “We’re
not going to implement this.”
We did some interviews over the telephone. We also did go out and observe some of the
inspection programs in Penn Station, in New Jersey, and Washington. We wanted to
identify the components of each search program, those issues with regard to legal
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authority, selection process, the inspection process. When there is a “hit,” how do they
resolve it? How do they handle public information. What are some of the dilemmas?

Scope and Methodology
•
•
•

Interviews conducted telephonically or in person: 10
All passenger inspection programs observed: 5
Approach:
– Identify common and unusual components of programs. For example:
•
•
•
•
•
•

How legal authority and constraints are dealt with
How passengers are selected
What is inspected, and how
How “hits” are resolved
How public information is handled
How deterrence and community policing are maximized

– Identify the factors that influenced transit agencies to implement
programs.
– Identify dilemmas facing all agencies.
– Identify best practices and lessons learned.

•

Guarantee: Program specifics safeguarded

June 18, 2009
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Purpose Today
• Our observations are preliminary.
• Today, we want to
– Present observations to transit operators
– Provoke a discussion
– Elicit reactions and corrections

• We also have a view: We want to make
selective screening a more viable option.
June 18, 2009
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What we’re talking about is search, examination, of a person or an article through
questioning or a search. Screening can either be passive, that is, with TV or observation,
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but that's different from an inspection or search. Selective means something less than a
hundred percent, and how do you get to that?

Observations on Factors
Influencing Decisions to
Implement

June 18, 2009
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Factors Influencing Implementation
Screening Decision
• Legal Authority:
– Initially agencies were unsure they could prevail in court. Now
they know they can.
– There are sustainable models as guides.

• Resources:
– Perceived costs
– Limited Federal assistance

• Perceptions of threat and difficulty of implementation:
– Agencies near a bigger transit target believe they are less likely
to be attacked.
– Agencies that operate light rail systems with large bus fleets face
more implementation challenges.

June 18, 2009
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We’re going to talk about our preliminary observations but we want to provoke
discussion, elicit your reactions, and, as a result, we want to ask, “What really makes a
program more viable? What works here?”
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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One of the big issues at the outset for some of the systems that were introducing these
programs early on, like Boston and New York, was legality. What’s the legal basis for
this? This is obviously going to be challenged in a court. Is it going to hold up? What
does this have to do with regard to the Fourth Amendment? That is a key issue. It has, by
the way, held up in a federal court, but that doesn’t end the argument. There are still
going to be challenges to this in state courts and, probably future challenges in federal
courts.
Some of the issues involve resources—how much does it cost to run these programs?
How much manpower has to be deployed in this? There’s only limited federal assistance,
both in terms of the amount and the time. What happens if the federal money runs out?
The reality we face is that I suspect—this is just a personal view, it’s not a research
result—that because of the country’s financial difficulties, the DHS budget is going to be
under enormous pressure over the next several years.
Perceptions of threat differ throughout the country. In New York, the perception of threat
is very high. In Washington, it’s high. You move west, and it is not so high. In California,
there is a tendency to say, “Terrorism is that thing they deal with back there on the other
coast. That’s not our particular problem.”
If you’re a smaller operator you might say, “They’re gonna attack those guys over there,
not us. I’m Valley Transit Authority, and the big target in the neighborhood is BART, not
me.” In some cases, the physical layout doesn’t lend itself to screening, or makes
screening more difficult. If you have big open-air systems. It’s harder to run inspection
programs.

Implementation Decisions (con’t)
•

Public Support:
– Without credible threats or actual attacks in the U.S., popular support
is determined locally.
– Community leaders (and transit leadership) weigh perceived security
benefits against concerns for civil liberties (Cost may be secondary).

•

Support or opposition can come from different places:
– A board chairman or board member/s (each board member can have a
unique constituency)
– A Police Commissioner
– A Mayor or a Governor
– Congress

•

Prompting events can include:
–
–
–
–

Success of another transit agency
Mass transit attacks overseas
Special event (Olympics, inauguration, national convention)
Red Team assessment and congressional intervention

June 18, 2009
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Public support varies greatly throughout the country. It varies from time to time. This is
constantly, constantly shifting.
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Community leaders and transit leadership are part of the equation In some cases, the
boards that govern these systems are local politicians or are appointed by local
politicians. These systems aren’t free of politics and that becomes a huge factor. Support
or opposition can come from different directions. You may have a board chairman or
board members who have specific constituencies. Or you may have a particularly
vigorous police commissioner who slams his fist down and wants something. You may
have a supporting governor or mayor. You also have congressional involvement in this.
And then you have the events themselves. If you are talking about implementation in the
immediate wake of the subway bombings in London, there is greater receptivity. As we
get somewhat distant from those events, receptivity goes down.

Implementation Decisions (con’t)
• There is no pre-determining pattern:
– 2 Locations with history of strong liberties advocates at or near
the 9/11 attacks moved out first.
– But one location – Washington DC – did not, even for the 2009
inauguration.
– One East Coast location that implemented first for a special
event had to wait for daily implementation for changed political
landscape.
– One West Coast location – Los Angeles – implemented a
program.
– View in one Mountain state was that public and leadership would
support selecting passenger screening

June 18, 2009
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Now could we find any kind of pattern in this? We really couldn’t. We've got a couple of
locations with a history of very strong civil liberties advocates, and yet those were the
systems that moved out first with screening.
The reason we have a panel here is our original agreement with all of the operators we
spoke with is that no systems are identified in the report. We simply took the information
and reconfigured it in terms of legal issues, inspection process issues, and so on. We
weren’t trying to do it by system. But we do have on the panel representatives from a
variety of systems who have programs in place and they can provide a front-line
perspective.
Those not implementing said, “We're going to emphasize passive surveillance.” They
may have emergency authority to implement, providing there is a specific threat. I'm
going to be candid about this. Sometimes selective screening is is a bit of a dodge by the

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

16

Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening

board, which says to the chief, “We're not going to tell you to do this, but if you decide
that there's a threat, and do it, okay; but it's on your head.

Implementation Decisions (con’t)
• For those not implementing:
– Passive surveillance is emphasized
– Emergency authority to implement explicitly or
implicitly provided if there is a specific threat

• For those implementing:
– Maintaining public and high level support
remain key.
– Civil liberties must be protected and racial
profiling guarded against.
June 18, 2009
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Now, for those implementing selective screening, maintaining that public and political
support is a key factor, not just for political reasons, but for the general reasons that you
do have to ensure that civil liberties are protected and racial profiling is guarded against.
With that brief background, let me turn it over to Bruce, who will go into some more
specific components of the program.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Thanks, Brian. I'm going to try and go a bit into warp speed here as to time, because
there are some challenges at the end that I think will provoke a lot of discussion. I do
want to say here one thing. I want to thank the transit authorities that interviewed with us.
I was watching some of the facial recognitions that you could tell where your quotations
were buried, but not with your names.
The cooperation has been really good. So this is a look at the various components,
looking for what’s common, and where there’s a variation. The first thing is there's legal
authority and sources of help. I think Brian has already said this. Some of these
authorities moved up very fast. There’s been police commissioners that said something
like, “Damn the torpedoes. I’m going to do it and we'll prevail.” And they did.
Others that were able to follow, the later ones all had good models to work with. Still
others today that I interview still seem to be uncertain that they would survive a legal
challenge. I’m not sure that’s actually accurate. That’s certainly their perception. I don’t
know if it’s actually accurate, or they have other reasons for hesitating.
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Components of Selective
Passenger Screening Programs
Common themes and variations

June 18, 2009
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Legal Authority and Sources of
Help
• A few agencies initiated programs and then prevailed in
key legal cases: New York and Boston.
• Others followed once precedent had been set
• Some still uncertain that they would survive legal
challenge or have other reasons for hesitating
• TRB Guidance on legal foundations useful
• MTI study provided encouragement and model for some

June 18, 2009
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I want to throw in another thing. The TRB (Transportation Research Board) guidance on
legal cases—I think it was Jocelyn Waite’s 2005 report—was quoted very often and it’s
really helpful. “The Case for Searches on Public Transportation,” TRB Legal Research
Digest, No. 22, October, 2005. Our study also is quoted.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Policies and General Orders
• Some pioneers “built the plane while flying it”
• Over time, Policies and General Orders were built on
experiences of others, and have matured.
• Typically, these documents specify:
–
–
–
–
–

Authority of transit police
Purpose, scope and method of inspection
Method of passenger selection
Voluntary nature of inspection
Controls (including supervision and documentation) to ensure
inspections follow policies and procedures.

June 18, 2009
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The first thing you’ve got to have is policies and general orders. Again, in the same way I
was just describing, some of the authorities that we talked to literally built the airplane
while flying it. One of them said that we got the materials, put the thing together on the
weekend and made the policy up as we did it. Others later then had mature policies to
build from.
I’m going to call out one that is particularly good. I think Boston will not mind me saying
this, because their particular general order is very well written, very well organized, and
has been providing good guidance for others. Typically, this is what these orders will lay
out.
And, you know, the scope of the inspection is really important—what its purpose is, the
authority of the officers, how the passengers are selected to make sure that it’s not racial
profiling and is sustainable in court, and the controls placed on it, and also the fact that
it’s voluntary.
Legal integrity was a term that came up quite often. By that, I think we mean that the
transit authority is concerned that with whatever decision that was made, whether it’s an
attorney general, or the case, their inspection process stays within the bounds of that. So
you want to make sure that they stay on literally the right side of the law. That ends up
being mostly about how you select passengers.
Two variations here: some are centrally controlled. The chief chooses the particular
number or set of numbers that the local supervisor implements; or there are others
where the local officer that's supervising the inspection point has the ability to change.
Here are the different ways that passengers are counted: Passengers with any bag,
passengers with airline-type bags, the sequence differed. In some cases, it was every
seventh, every eighth, and every tenth, regardless of who was being inspected. In some,
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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the count was restarted when a passenger was inspected; others, the count continued.
So it was continuous in ones that were interrupted. Agencies allowed officers’ discretion,
when there was probable cause or suspicious behavior, to do questions and arrests.
They all also allowed, in one form or another, the local supervisor to alter the inspection
sequence for line management. For those transit agencies that haven’t done this, I think
this is one of the things that needs to be understood, that there’s flexibility to make sure
that the line doesn’t gum up and actually create a target in and of itself. I saw that
demonstrated in several places we’ve looked at.

How is Legal Integrity Maintained when
Selecting Passengers?
• A primary concern for all is maintaining legal “integrity”
by avoiding discrimination and racial profiling, and
inspections conducted out of procedure.
• Methods used to determine random selection of
passengers differed:
– Some are centrally controlled with only one or two options for
supervisors, based on passenger flow
– Some provide local supervisors with more discretion within
specified boundaries
June 18, 2009
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All of the agencies had a manual count but one—I was going to cite that later as a best
practice—which uses a computer-generated random count. I’m going to make this
example up. It’s the second, it’s the fourth, it’s the eleventh, the thirteenth, the
eighteenth, the nineteenth, the thirtieth passenger, and that sequence changes each day,
so it becomes impossible to predict from one day to another.
The screening is voluntary, but once it starts, once that officer grabs the bag, we found it
common that it has to be continued. You can’t back out. You can back out before, and
there are signs that allow you to do it. If you haven’t paid your fare, you can back out
before. But once it starts, it’s got to be finished. That’s the standard that we saw.
Signage is really important. For one, it designated how far the signs are, how many have
to be there. I think there was a court order or an AG decision that said, “It’s got to be X
type. It’s got to be a certain distance.” I’m going to point out when there was a good best
practice. Everyone has a web site, so Amtrak has a very good video on their boarding
system that tells the passengers what's going to be happening. You can go and see that
any time you want.
If there is a refusal to go through screening, and Brian and I both saw this, the
consequences differ. In a large station, the passenger can leave, but can board the train
in another place, so you wonder what’s the value in that. We’re going to get into that
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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later. Smaller stations, the transit authorities say you have to leave the station entirely.
You’ll have to go somewhere else. The last one, you can figure out what transit agency
this is because it’s an actual ticket. You know, you can’t board the train. You get a refund,
but you can board another one.

Legal Integrity (con’t)
– All use a count of passengers, but count differs. Variations
include:
• All passengers
• All passengers with any bag
• All passenger with airline-type carry-on bags.

– Sequence differs. Variations include:
• A continuous count
• A count that restarts with each inspection

– All allowed officers discretion to:
• Question passengers displaying suspicious behavior
• Make arrest upon reasonable suspicion or exigent circumstances
• Reduce frequency for line management.

– All but one used a manual count (one in every X passengers);
one used a random count generated by computer each day.
June 18, 2009
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Voluntary Screening and
the Consequences of Refusal
•

All agency programs make baggage inspection voluntary. But once
inspection starts, it must be completed.

•

All agencies have signage. For at least one, signage is a
particularly important part of the program, often posted a
designated number of feet away.

•

Agencies also post policies on their websites (AMTRAK runs a
video in the boarding area).

•

Consequence of refusals differs:
– Passenger must leave but can board elsewhere in station
– Passenger must leave the station
– Passenger cannot board the train but can get a refund and re-board
another train

•

Passengers who are ordered to leave transit property and refuse
can be arrested.

June 18, 2009
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Passengers that refuse can go out on their own, but if they refuse to leave, and they're
ordered to leave, they can be questioned and possibly arrested if they resist.

Voluntary Screening (con’t)
•

Nearly all screening refusals are benign -- based in strong views of
personal rights. (Passenger behavior usually confirms absence of
threat)

•

More significant are those who evade or avoid screening.
– Most often indicates contraband
– Could also indicate terrorist surveillance, trial run, or operation.

•

When there is evasion or avoidance, officers can and do question
passengers and then further determine if additional action is
needed. (Suspicious Activity Reports can be and are filed)

•

Common Observation: Older white males have strongest objections
to screening.
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Almost all of the refusals are benign. They were people that have strong views about
personal liberties. They don’t want their bags searched. The officer knows it. It’s really
clear. It’s not a security issue. You know, they’re handled well. They’re turned around and
say, “Well, then, fine. You can go, but you have to leave the station.” It’s done very well.
Far more significant are the people evading or avoiding screening, and that most often
means contraband. One of the agencies I was at said, “When they run, they’ve got
drugs, you know? Or they’ve got an illegal weapon.” Or it could be terrorist surveillance.
Where there is evasion or avoidance, the officers who are trained properly in behavioral
observation can and do question the passengers to determine if additional action is
needed. Very often, there’s no action needed, but they’ll file a report, which will go into
the local system, and we’ll talk about that later also.
Every single transit agency we talked to said the people that object the most to screening
are people that are older white males, because I think they say if you were alive at
Woodstock, and you can remember the '60s, then you object. “Security is someone
else's problem, you know? It’s not me you should be looking at. You should be looking at
that dark guy over there.”
Let’s turn to ocumentation and the range of documentation kept. Everyone takes, keeps
documentation; some people audit.
Let’s go to intelligence and information.
Now this is a sensitive issue because everyone’s trying hard to do intelligence-sharing
and information-sharing, and it never can get exactly right, but this is, in general, what we
heard, When you detail a transit officer to the JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force), or the
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local fusion or diffusion center, you get good results. When you create a trusted
relationship with a state or federal agency, you get good results and high praises.

What Role does Documentation Play?
•

All agencies keep some documentation.
– Some agencies keep more extensive records on gender and apparent
race of those inspected.
– Some agencies keep less detailed records.

•

All agencies document passenger complaints.

•

Most agencies document positive “hits”.

•

Some agencies review inspection records to ensure inspection is
random and cannot be predicted.
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Paul Lennon, Mass Transit Division, got a lot of good kudos for the kinds of liaison
they’re performing with the transit agencies, both TSA and FTA. Tony Tisdale and also
Sonya Carter were repeatedly mentioned as people that are from the transit agencies,
know how transit works, and know how to work with the agencies. In my personal
experience with FA security, if we hired people from inside the industry, they were
tougher on the industry than we were, because they knew what was going on. They also
knew how to help.
The issues that were expressed, and this is just classic, is when the IC (intelligence
community) produces something, it wasn't particularly timely. This was a classic quote:
“The gentleman is here.” It’s that “CNN tells us more.” This is something I’ve seen in
information sharing, there is an overload phase, we’re in right now. We’re getting
duplicative reporting, getting flooded by email, and there’s no siphon that says what’s
real or not. So you tune it out, and that’s what we found from DHS, TSA, and some of the
supported activities. I know that’s being worked on now and it's a difficult problem.
Standard inspection team: I’ll point out the fact that usually there’s a K-9 team in the
area, and there’s plain-clothes officers watching.
Professionalism is important—it’s strongly mentioned. You know, being customer-friendly
and professional goes together. They do that with training and supervision. The ones we
saw really showed a high familiarity with the environment, and they have a sixth sense
about what’s there and what’s out of order, you know? The crazy guy that’s living in the
station? You know him, right? He’s not a threat. He might even tell you some information
that you need to know. A new person would look at the guy and say, “He’s got a huge,
baggy coat. We need to search him.” But if you know the guy that’s been there for a long
time knows, “No. That's just Joe.” We saw a lot of that.
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Intelligence and Information
• Opinions varied, but generally:
• Highest value given to
– Transit officers located at JTTFs and Fusion Centers
– Trusted relationships established with other State and local police
and sometimes with federal agencies
– Personal interaction with TSA’s Mass Transit Division leadership
and individual government staff from TSA and FTA, who received
high praise.

• Issues expressed with
– Timeliness of information from the Intelligence Community
– Controls on information: “CNN tells us more.”
– Overload: Volume of sometimes duplicative information
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Inspection team composition
• While there are variations, the typical
inspection consists of:
– One supervisor
– One selecting officer
– Two inspecting officers
– At least one canine team in the area
– Plainclothes officers in the area observing
passengers
June 18, 2009
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There is a service mentality. You talk to people; you get to know them. It’s a good thing.
They help the line. Attention to detail in the inspection.
A couple of the agencies did very good on the actual inspection and associated training.
I used to do watch inspections at airports, and one of the agencies did what I would call a
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model ETD (Explosive Trace Detection) inside and outside bag search that would have
worked really well, and probably better than most TSA screeners.

How is Professionalism Maintained?
•

All agencies strongly emphasize customer-friendly and professional
demeanor, and reinforce that with training and supervision.

•

All supervisors and officers observed seemed to combine:
–
–
–
–

Familiarity with environment (they see what is out of order)
Customer service mentality (they are friendly and courteous)
Helpful line management
Attention to detail

•

One or two agencies seem particularly focused on inspection
techniques and associated training.

•

All understand that they are observed not only by the public but also
by terrorists conducting surveillance.

•

Detection and deterrence are mutually supportive.
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Also, they all understand that they’re being observed. This is a stage; this is a show. I
don’t mean a show in a bad sense of the word.The public is watching us and it gives
them confidence; but the other guys are watching.
It’s a mistake to say that this is just deterrence, we just go through the motion.
Professional watchers look and they know the difference, and someone who knows what
they're searching and how to look for it. They’re going to look at that.
The 9/11 hijackers scoped out the aviation system. They knew what the weaknesses
were. So you can't just say, “Deterrence. Let's just put a bunch of dogs out there,”
because we actually have to really have the people trained and know what they’re doing.
What’s searched? Not passengers—it’s bags. Size counts. The size of the bag could be
small. I think these are some of the reasons. For others, it may actually call out only
passengers with the larger, carry-on bags, but it’s more fitting for the threats and
destruction we’ve seen in Madrid and London, which is closer to 15 to 20 pound bags.
Interestingly, one of the agencies that focused on airline bags maintained the integrity of
the count by handing out a card to someone that didn't have a bag, saying, “Had you had
a bag, you would have been inspected.” That’s an interesting kind of compromise. I
maintain the count if I only inspect people with bags, it's a good compromise.
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How Are Bags Inspected and When
Are They Opened?
• There are a range of practices, from hand search, to
canine search, to Explosive Trace Detectors (ETD’s).
• All specify an inspection sequence. Sequence of ETD,
canine and hand-search may vary.
• All but one searched only outside of the bag with ETD
as primary inspection, minimizing hand-search to avoid
personal intrusion.
• In these cases, bags only opened when there is an
ETD “hit”.
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DAVE SCHLESINGER
Just to ask a quick question. I’m just real curious about the comment that “we only
search bags.” Is that something that’s been prevalent across all agencies?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
That we talk to, yes. This is a sensitive area.
What are they inspected for? It's a narrow focus on the things that terrorists could use. In
general orders, they say the bags can be opened and manipulated. Some look for any
size of explosives. Some look for a larger amount. We’re going to talk about that as an
issue later. It’s a limited search. You know, reading material. He’s not supposed to read it.
And although the searches are specifically are not designed to detect contraband, if it’s
detected incidental to the search, it can, and has, led to an arrest, and those arrests have
been sustained in court, at least in one jurisdiction I talked to. So if you find drugs
incidental, or you find something else, you can take action. But the focus of the
inspection is not on drugs.
How are the bags opened? Here are the range of practices, with different sequences. All
but one searched only outside of the bag with a trace detector as the primary inspection
team. Minimizes the hand search, the intrusion.
In those cases, the bags were opened where there was a hit. Now it’s important to know
what a “hit” is—we’re not talking about gun hits, but ETD hits. You can have a various set
of alarms from different reasons. I’m going to get to that later. These are the kinds of
things we found, and it’s really a combination of three things—questions to the
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passenger: Do you have heart medication? Have you been working on a range? Are you
a police officer? Military officer? In the mining industry? Black powder. Do you have black
powder or C4 or TNT on you? That would set the alert off. Then, physical inspection of
the bag. And finally, watching the reaction of the passenger.

Inspecting and Opening Bags (con’t)
• ETD “hits” resolved by combination of:
– Questions to determine a benign positive alarm:
• Black powder or other explosive (military, police, mining)
• Nitroglycerine (heart medication)
• Certain make-up

– Physical inspection
– Observation of passenger reaction

• One agency routinely performed careful ETD and hand
search on inside of bag.
• By contrast, one agency planned to use only manual
search to speed inspection.
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If the passenger is sitting there saying, “Fine. Go ahead.” Then the officer knows. You
can see it. They know right away there’s no issue here. If the passenger starts to get
nervous, you’ve got a problem, a different reaction.
I think I mentioned the agency that did both inside and outside of the bag. By interesting
contrast, one of the agencies planned to use only manual search in order to reduce the
time. So that gives you an interesting contrast. Technology traces what’s used. There are
times when older units are not so good; newer units, better. The reaction of the
passenger is positive, curious, or, as Brian would imitate, bored or whatever.
The trace units can be set to detect drugs, but actually, they are set for explosives, which
is appropriate for the scope of the search.
JOHN MCPARTLAND
Can you back that up one, please?
“The passenger reaction seems positive or curious or bored?”
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Yeah. People that have been through it before or in airlines know boredom, or know that
this is a normal thing. So their reaction could be curious: “They’ve got this technology.
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They’re swabbing it. What is that thing?” Or positive: “I like this. You’re screening. You’re
not opening my bag.”

What Technology is Used?
• ETD only technology routinely utilized
• Time involved is only 10 to 15 seconds
• Older units are larger and less mobile; newer models
lighter, more mobile
• Passenger reaction seems positive, or curious, or
bored
• Some units can detect drugs and explosives; but
settings always on explosives
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Technology used (con’t)
• ETD’s can give “true” or “false” positives that are almost
always benign
– “true” when they detect explosives or elements of explosives
used legitimately;
– “false” when they detect chemical compound related to
explosives.

• As detection technology eliminates known “false”
positives, manufacturing may create new ones
• One model at one inspection point that was observed
gave false positives if sample became saturated.
• But on rare occasions – both in and outside of screening
– hits have detected persons of interest.
June 18, 2009

32

There are true positives that are benign. The ones I was talking about before is what I
call those. This is the military/police officer one. There are probably others. There are
false positives or other positives that, when they detect chemical compounds related to
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explosives. There’s kind of a race here as technology detection eliminates some of the
known false positives, for example, those coming from makeup or Magic Markers. As the
detection technology eliminates those false positives, manufacturing processed are
going to keep bringing more of them, so there's always going to be a need to take a hit
and ask, “What have I got here?” Not jump to the conclusion that you’ve got a problem.
Pass that information around the transit community, too.
It’s also important to avoid saturation of the samples in quality control. I saw that at one
point. You’ve got to watch that one, because that can give you hits all the time, and really,
the machine isn’t operating properly. On rare occasions—this is the jewel in the crown,
this is what this is all about—both inside and outside screen, hits have detected persons
of interest as defined by the GATO (Global Air Traffic Operations). We did confirm that.

What Role do Canines play?
•

Common in agency programs

•

Provide both detection and deterrence (even when not actively
searching)

•

One agency relies almost exclusively on canines

•

Nearly all place a canine team near any screening operation;
– for some this is a 100% requirement
– for others it is as often as possible

•

Canines can be used to screen the outside and inside of bags – they
are “trace detectors” and also generate benign “hits”
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Doggies. They’re common, and they do both detection and deterrence. One agency
almost completely relies on them. Almost all of them place a K-9 team near the screen
operation, which is important. They also are trace detectors. They can be used to screen
the outside or the inside of the bag. They also can generate benign hits, though, for false
positives, like Magic Markers.
There is a special dog program that TSA started, but I’m not sure has been actively
pushing, and that’s that at Auburn University. They’ve been training dogs to detect
explosive amounts present in the vapor wakes left by multiple people. Our understanding
is that when these were trialed and tested, they performed very well in blind testing, not
double-blind testing. There is a film we could show you, they’re positioned as people go
past, multiple people combined. They appear to be very well trained, and, with good
quality control, they can detect very, very faint amounts of explosives. Passenger
reaction is very positive. Reaction by terrorists, we think, is they have a high respect for
dogs. Whether it’s valid or not, we know that they do.
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By the way, dogs can not work and not tell you, but dogs can really work, and it all
depends on the quality control and the handling. The key thing here is that these dogs
can detect, can essentially screen, more than one person at a time. That's the beauty of
it.

Vapor-Wake Detection Canine
Teams
• Canines have also recently been trained by Auburn
University to detect explosives in the vapor wakes left by
people as an additional duty.
– Positioned as people go past, canines sniff vapor wakes to
determine presence of explosives.
– Appear to be a formidable deterrent
– Appear to be an effective way of passively screening multiple
passengers, not just those going through inspection
– Reaction by most passengers is positive; reaction by those
hiding something probably different
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Are Passengers Screened?
• While passengers are not searched unless there is probable cause,
passengers ARE in fact passively screened in two ways
– Officers trained in behavior observation, including uniformed and
plainclothes, observe all passengers entering screening.
– One agency used communication between highly trained plainclothes
officers in the boarding areas with those conducting the screening
process.
– In some agencies, canines trained for vapor wake detection are
deployed (two agencies have canines trained by Auburn)

• All agencies train their uniformed and plainclothes officers in
different types of behavioral observation training. Some take a
particularly aggressive approach.
June 18, 2009
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Are Passengers Screened? (Con’t)
• All agencies train their regular employees in a shortened
version of the same training, based on the NTI transit
employee training
• The focus of these observations is more on those
evading inspection than on those willingly going through
it.
• In short, all agencies understand that the value of the
passenger inspection is not the inspection, but:
– deterrent value of the inspection for those observing it
– the behavior it evokes on the part of those avoiding inspection
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Are passengers screened? Well, they’re searched, but they are screened in two ways. I
think this is the key part of this whole program. It's not the inspection. It’s the opportunity
to observe behavior, particularly those “gaming” during inspection. If the officer is trained
in behavioral observation, it’s very good. Observe all the passengers. In one agency,
they had plain-clothes people at the boarding areas using sophisticated communications
that indicate to the screening supervisor, “I’ve got somebody I want you to particularly
look at.” In three agencies, you had K-9s in a vertical wave detection. If you put the
behavioral observation together, and you put the K-9s together, and you really work them
as a team, you're essentially looking at every person coming through, whether they're
being inspected or not. You're looking particularly at the people that should give you the
most interest-those that are trying to evade the inspection.
JOHN MCPARTLAND
Are there standard courses in that?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Yes. They’re called BASS/PATRIOT Terrorist Awareness Recognition and Reaction.
Patriot’s the latest version, but they’re always being improved, and NTI, National Transit
Institute, has some excellent, excellent stuff for transit employees. Highly recommended,
both their modules and their films. I’ve looked at their training film. It’s really good.
Here’s the training. Any one of the people here can give you information on where to go.
Again, the focus of the observation is on those evading, not those going through it, and
that third point is what I’m trying to say. That’s the value. It’s not the inspection. The
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inspection is almost a prompting event. It prompts behavior and it’s the behavior you’re
watching. That’s the value of the program.
That’s not going to be understood by civil liberties advocates. It’s not going to be
understood by the public; and my suggestion is that we don’t try and explain it. They’re
going to start asking questions like, “Are you trailing the people once they leave?” But I
think, for the transit community, considering this, they need to understand that it's not
catching people with bombs in the bags. It's watching people evade and watching the
inspection process that gives the value to it.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
I wanted to ask you a question about the behavior. You said that you prompt people to be
stopped, and you look at their behavior, if they get nervous, they are very likely to be
watched, but do you have any data to indicate the Al Qaida-like terrorist who probably
has religious fervor and doesn't care about dying, would he also act in a nervous way?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Yeah. The BASS/PATROIT programs are based on lots of detailed studies of what even
a trained terrorist will still show.
BRIAN JENKINS
In 1999, an Al Qaida-linked terrorist coming from Canada, tried to cross the Canadian
border on his way to the Los Angeles Airport. He was stopped by a customs agent on the
border. There were a number of things going on through the custom agent’s
head—number one, why is he taking this peculiar route to get to his location, because it's
not the usual route. That’s a little bit unusual. So this experienced customs agent asks
him a couple of questions, just the interaction tells the agent there’s something not quite
right about this individual. The route’s not right. The answer isn’t quite right, and so she
simply says, “Would you step out of the car, sir?”, at which point he bolts out of the car.
He’s tackled. They open the trunk of the car. It’s loaded with explosives. This man is now
doing 35 years. The plan was to bring a bomb to Los Angeles.
There are ample examples even of terrorists arousing suspicion in the course of their
mission. Here’s a concrete example, and it’s been public: Mohammed Atta, the leader of
the 9/11 hijacking team. The fellow who checked him in at the airport worked on the
airport counter for 26 years and his perception was, “There's something wrong here. This
is absolutely wrong.” Unfortunately he didn’t do anything more with that information.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
The other thing is that the training teaches you to look for physical behaviors that are
very difficult for people to control. You know, the pulsing of the neck, the redness of the
neck, is something that is very hard for people to actually really pretend to be normal
when they’re about to blow themselves up. It's not a natural act. I suppose it can be
done, but it’s not. When you’re actually being watched by trained people, they have a
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good chance, especially if they’ve been in that station for years and years and years, and
they know what’s normal.
RON MASCIANA
It's a good question, but it’s not a new question. And we have to go back to how law
enforcement deals with a crime, and interaction with those who we feel may have
committed a crime. You’re going to see physiological effects on somebody that you stop
for a burglary or a robbery, and all we’re adding, even BASS, those elements of instinct
that we see and experience, and put it in context to the terrorist world.
The question here is that we’ve set up screening outside. Because of the tendency of
people to get really upset with their civil liberties, that since we do the screening of
everybody going into the board meetings now, if somebody decides that they really want
to see how much junk they can stir up, all they’ve got to do is say that: a) I’m being
profiled, and b) I’m this, that, and everything else. Are there any of these agencies that
are doing periodic or random screening? Do they have it set up so that they have
surveillance cameras in order to protect both the rights of the public as well as the rights
of the agency, in the event that some person turns it into a political issue?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
I tell you what. There are going to be people here, I know, who have those systems. It’s
both cameras and documentation stuff.
BRIAN JENKINS
We are going to deal with that in the panel. A short answer, you should use of cameras in
conjunction with screening, and particularly where you are expecting confrontation, that
is, expecting someone to create an incident, cameras aren’t a bad idea.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
I’m going to try and get through this, so I can turn this back over to Brian. The questions
have been really good, though. Thank you.
Picture-taking: We have a range that goes all the way from one agency which, upon
learning its inspections were on YouTube, reached out to the guy and say, “Let’s help
make sure you understand what you’ve got.” Perfectly legitimate. Others had an absolute
policy, no pictures of any screening taken that’s on transit property. Absolutely none. One
system we talked to said even passengers taking pictures of trains is not allowed.
Though now they all do allow officers to go up and question people that are taking
pictures to make sure that the motives are benign.
Deterrence is important. These are the ways in which it’s maximized. I thought this was
very good. You’ve got major stations, but you’ve got small stations. You’ve got peak
hours, and off-peak hours. Passenger selection can be varied through the system or by
inspection posts. I haven’t mentioned before, and Brian is going to mention later, at least
in one system, the inspection supervisor is allowed to say, “All right. In addition to once
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every seven, I’m going to choose every seventh person carrying a bag over their right
shoulder.” I mean that becomes very difficult to predict if you’re watching.

How is Public Information
Controlled?
• All agencies post some information on their
websites.
• Some undertook an aggressive and continuing
media campaign.
• Others knew media would come to them.
• All have assigned personnel to answer
questions and prepared Q’s and A’s.
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Different Responses to
Picture-Taking
•

There are marked differences in the response to a passenger taking
pictures of inspection operations or even any part of transit property.
– One agency, upon learning that its inspections were on U-Tube,
assisted the person to increase public knowledge that inspections were
taking place.
– Others had an absolute policy of no pictures being taken of any
screening operation, with eviction from property and possible arrest
being the consequence.
– Some even had a policy of no pictures taken anywhere in the system,
even by passengers, and even of normal train activity.
– Most had a policy of allowing police officers to question those taking
pictures to ensure that their intentions were benign.
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They all have public information. The “see-something/say-something” programs that are
common are very good.
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Then you’ve got community policing. It’s quite impressive. They have heavily armed guys
with dogs go through trains and stations. People say, “Why? This is really serious. Long
guns, etc.” And also the K-9s, even when they’re not visibly searching, no one really
knows that they’re not. They can just be wandering around, taking a rest, but people
think that they’re searching. So it’s an added benefit there.
There were some creative practices. Computer-generated sequence each day I thought
was a really good one.
Community policing is brilliant, for all these guys around the panel will tell you, in many
ways, it’s just an extension of good, solid community policing in the station, where you’re
interacting with passengers and the vendors, even to the homeless where it’s legal for
them to stay. I just mentioned New York.There’s a large vagrant population. They get to
know them. They watch. They’ll tell them when there’s crime. They’re additional eyes.
Outside the station, one was particularly great, going to all the businesses at some of the
transit entrances, and saying, “Look. This is our program. Here it is in your language. If
you see a crime, if you see something that's odd or off, tell us.” And all of this encourages
information, deterrents, and support for the program. To me, I think the most important
thing is it increases the chance that police officers know when something is in place and
out of place, which is both a rational and a matter of emotional intelligence.
I’m going to skip quality control. All I’ll say is that only one system used Red Team
Testing. We had a range from agencies that had very detailed contingency plans for
doing more intensive screening at different threat levels to ones that had very little.
As for the benefits for the transit agencies—they’ve received an increase in deterrence.
They’ve received an increase in public confidence and assurance. The reaction from the
public toward the people and agencies that put this in place, I think they will tell you is
overwhelmingly positive, or it’s certainly acceptable. Once you get past the original, you
know, “What is this?” it’s either a ho-hum or it’s a good thing.
I want to leave with this, because this is so important. Two agencies detailed cases
where suspicious persons and operations had been detected and confirmed.
And that leads me to the final thought—you know the old bear joke, right? There’s two
guys that are running from a grizzly bear. One turns to the other and says, “Why should
we run? A grizzly bear can run 35 miles an hour. We can only run 15.” And the guy says,
“I’m not trying to outrun the grizzly bear. I’m trying to outrun you.”
Back to Brian.
BRIAN JENKINS
Let me just underscore a couple of things here, and then we’ll take a quick break before
the panelists convene. Behavioral observation training is an area on the move. It is
improving. We don’t have an X-ray for a man’s soul, nor do we have individuals that can
be so well trained that they can look at an individual and know what’s inside their heads.
However, we are learning that there are some basic indicators that may provide an
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additional set of clues. That’s about as good as it gets in that area. That training is very
valuable.

Best Practices
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We keep mentioning training here. One of the presentations on the panel deals with
training. It is an important ingredient of these programs.

1. Behavioral Observation Training
– All agencies provide to officers and an abbreviated
version to paid staff
– Some aggressively update training and keep it fresh
– Because the “eyes” of staff and officers see more
than those being inspected, and can differentiate
between the normal (including the bizarre) and the
abnormal or suspicious, this appears to be a wise
investment.
– Some agencies have apparently detected possible
terrorist surveillance.
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Underscoring another point that Bruce made, while our focus is on the inspection, on the
selective screening, this is not a standalone measure. Screening is one component of an
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array of measures, including use of TV cameras, physical patrols and other measures.
Bruce mentioned a very interesting one, where one of the agencies went to the local
businesses around the entrances and enlisted them in information gathering. That was
an interesting way of expanding screening security efforts.

2. Community Policing Inside and Outside
•

All agencies encourage officers and staff to interact with passengers
during inspections and at other times.

•

This increases information and improves officer and staff “gut” sense
of what is normal and what is out of place – which is invaluable.

•

But one agency went further and:
– Went to all businesses (and local police) near each transit stop
– Reached out to different ethnic communities in different languages
– Explained the program and asked to be kept informed of suspicious
activity – criminal or otherwise
– Left flyers
– Regularly re-freshed contacts

•

Results:
– Increases information flow and extends “eyes and ears”
– Extends deterrence
– Increases public support in key communities (including Islamic community
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3. Unpredictability: Keep ‘em Guessing
•

All agencies choose stations and times for inspection randomly. But…
– One agency utilized computer-generated, daily-altered random number for
passenger selection.
– One agency allowed inspection supervisor to select passengers based on
carefully chosen other factors difficult to predict that stay clear of ethnic
profiling.
– One agency searched cars and areas around stations based on color of
vehicle or number on license plates.
– One agency picked stations based on tips and left luggage, or based on
some physical configuration (e.g., position of stairs).

•

The selection methods that are impossible to predict by analysis or observation
are a best practice.

•

Racial profiling IS a predictable selection method, and should be avoided not
only for legal and ethical reasons, but for security reasons as well.
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In my view, and we can talk about this more during the panel presentations, there are
three reasons for randomness. One is it ought not to be predictable to the bad guys.
Having said that, I don’t really see terrorists who would make a serious investment in
constructing a bomb coming up to an inspection point and saying, “I think I’m not the
seventh guy. I’m going to try to go through.” I think their reaction is going to be, “Here’s
an inspection point. I don’t know what the hell the count is. I’m going somewhere else.”
And that’s really the reaction you want. So, yes, it should be unpredictable, but I don't
see terrorists trying to beat the numbers. This is not roulette.
The second reason for the randomness is for the protection—the legitimate protection of
civil liberties, so that we are not doing things wrong.
The third reason really for what are being pushed in a direction of randomness is that I
think the inspectors themselves, in some cases, might get a little too confident about
their ability to make choices, and those choices may be the right or wrong choices. While
these are in many cases experienced officers, you really don't want to put your entire
trust on an individual inspector, or somebody making that call. You want to yank them
back in the direction of randomness. So it has three purposes.
Plain-clothes and physical inspection: Plain-clothes officers are part of the search. They
really get to watch a lot of things that are going on, and as Bruce and I’ve mentioned,
they really know these stations. They know their neighborhoods, they know their
territories.

(4) Plainclothes Officers
•

All use plainclothes officers to detect suspicious behavior, including
those avoiding inspection.

•

Experienced officers know the environment; they know what is
ordinary, and when someone needs to be questioned.

•

Selective screening prompts behavior; observing it provides the
main benefit.

•

All agencies appear to collect and file SARS.

•

One agency, however,
– Gave month-long counter-surveillance training to officers
– Placed them in boarding areas and on trains
– Enabled them to communicate remotely with screening supervisor
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I’m a Californian, when I come to New York, I get on the subway, and somebody’s telling
me that, “We’re looking for aberrant behavior.” I think I’m in the zoo here! And yet,
walking across the station with a couple of the officers, they walk right up to this guy, and
say, “John, you know, you’re not supposed to be in here. We told you. You’ve got to
leave.” That’s the kind of intimate neighborhood knowledge local police have.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

38

Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce Butterworth: Rail Passenger Selective Screening

(5) Vapor Wake Detection Canines
•

All agencies have canines, but normal application is to screen cars, bags,
parcels, sometimes assist bomb technicians, and provide deterrence.

•

Auburn has trained canines to screen vapor wakes of people.

•

Some agencies have Auburn-trained canines

•

When trained, qualified, and carefully and regularly tested in their working
environment, vapor-wake detection dogs can provide significant detection and
deterrence benefits for all those boarding or going through an inspection point.

•

Even when not actively searching, they provide deterrence.

•

Respected by terrorists, they are liked by passengers.

•

Given the difficulty of creating stand-off passive detection, vapor-wake
detection dogs should be further utilized, but also regularly re-qualified by TSA
and agencies, using realistic testing methods.

•

TSA and other agency involvement is crucial
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(6) Shows of Force
• Heavily armed officers arriving en mass at stations or
moving through trains add deterrence.
•

Joint Operations with other police departments and
agencies:
– Increase deterrence
– Increase HQ and field level partnership and planning
– Identify need for cross-training and decisions on procedures to
be followed
– Create foundation for mutual assistance for special events and
emergencies (Transit police assisted WMATA during
inauguration)
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It would be nice if we had technology that could enable us to do bulk detection. We don’t
have that yet, but dogs are doing some pretty interesting things here.
Other best practices: The idea of details of transit police with the fusion centers and
JTTFs, I think that makes sense. They’re part of the overall effort here. Inspections
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performed by diverse officers is another defense against racial or ethnic profiling. That’s
important. Again, a creative use of plain-clothes performing surveillance and deterrence
even on their way to the inspection positions, and communicating with one another, that
is good.

Other Best Practices
7) Detailing transit police to JTTFs and Fusion Centers and building
good relationships with LE agencies is essential.
8) Inspections performed by diverse officers help counter fears of
“racial profiling”.
9) Smaller, portable trace units appear to provide advantages.
10)One agency’s General Order has been viewed and adopted by
others.
11)One agency placed officers along its system and had them perform
surveillance and deterrence on their way to inspection position.
12)Collaboration with TSA airport screeners can bring additional skills.
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The last one here, I wouldn't have said this years ago. Airport screeners, when they were
run by private contractors, were a disaster. But now that we actually have a stable TSA
screening force, we have people gaining a lot of frontline experience, and TSA is
beginning to capture really good experience. I think there can be some transfer of
knowledge and best practices.
GREG HULL
If I could, one of the points that was made on best practices, and it goes back to a slide
you had on intelligence and information. Just for the folks that are here, so that you’re
aware, where the major agencies are invited to the JTTF, which is a tremendous
resource, there’s a lot of others who don't have that resource, and so we look to other
systems. What we have agreed to do, and we confirmed this at a meeting we had with
our federal partners, our mass-transit sector coordinating council. It's our policy-level
interface look at that particular area of DHS.
We’ve agreed to pull together a working group to look at the whole issue of information
sharing, and this is not relative to JTTF, but in these other modes, we do have a
public-transit ISAP, an information-sharing analysis center. How do we combine that into
the most effective system possible?
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BRIAN JENKINS
Thanks for bringing us up-to-date on the issue of information-sharing. There is a
difference, by the way, between intelligence-sharing and information-sharing, and we get
hung up; the feds every now and again get hung up around intelligence-sharing.
For the operators—the people running the systems, running the security for the
systems—for the most part don’t need the sensitive intelligence. When bombs go off in
Mumbai or London, you don’t need to know who did it, and how do we know that? That’s
an intelligence question. What you really need to know is, “What did they do and now
how did they do it, and, therefore, what do I need to do, to protect our system fast?” And
that’s information. We don’t have to classify that. We don’t need top secret clearances to
know that. That’s something that has to move out really fast.
And here’s a case where the NYPD has been ahead of the feds in getting that
information out faster. Operating systems need to know that within a couple of hours.

Figure 1 Brian Jenkins Speaks to One of the Participants at the APTA Rail
Passenger Selective Screening Summit
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PANEL SESSION, PART ONE:
PAUL MACMILLAN, RON MASCIANA AND ED PHILLIPS
BRIAN JENKINS
Let’s get started again. We haven’t imposed a specific presentation requirement, but
each one of our panelists represents an operating system, or, in one case, a training
function. While Bruce and I have talked about these in conceptual terms, they will be
able to talk to you in terms of dealing with these issues in real life.

Five Dilemmas for Discussion
1.

SHOULD PASSENGER SELECTION AND BAG SEARCHES BE
LIMITED TO LARGER BAGS?

2.

DO OFFICERS HAVE SUFFICIENT LATITUDE TO SEARCH
THOSE THEY VIEW MORE LIKELY TO BE CARRYING A
BOMB?

3.

HOW CAN MORE RANDOMNESS BE ENTERED INTO THE
PASSENGER COUNT AND RETAIN LEGAL INTEGRITY

4.

HOW MUCH SHOULD A DETERRENCE-BASED PROGRAM
FOCUS ON DETECTION?

5.

HOW MUCH ACCESS HOUDL BE GIVEN TO THOSE SEEKING
TO RECORD THE INSPECTION THEMSELVES?
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Some of these issues they will address were brought to us during the course of research.
We don’t always know what the right answers are. One interesting question that came up
was regarding the issue of “should passenger selection and bag-based searches be
limited to larger bags? Both larger and smaller bags? Should it be strictly person
regardless of what they're carrying?”
Do the officers on the scene have sufficient latitude within a random-dictated system to
respond to something that they really do think is suspicious? How do we do that, and at
the same time, maintain the integrity of the randomness?
Bruce touched upon this point detection versus deterrence. This is primarily a deterrent
measure. I mean, quite honestly, if an inspection point finds a terrorist standing in front of
the table with a bomb, we've just found the dumbest terrorist in the world. So this is
primarily about deterrence; but, having said that, it's still a detection system.
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Some Opportunities for Discussion
1. Voluntary Search may be better than
mandatory search
2. When there is selective passenger
baggage inspection, behavioral
observation and highly-trained vaporwake detection canines can screen all
passengers and their bags by
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Opportunities for Discussion (con’t)
3. Suspicious Activity Reporting:
–

National SAR initiative is improving national data
reporting, analysis, and dissemination
•
•
•
•
•

–

–

Local legacy systems can perform regional and national
searches of SAR data
Data includes indicators, responses, results
Examples of State and local police now participating:
Miami-Dade, NYSIC, Virginia Fusion Center
Data involves trains and buses
Terrorist and criminal cases have been opened

Transit agency PDs could create a national SAR
“shared space” dedicated to transit indicators and
responses (e.g., e.g., left luggage, suspicious
picture taking)
Program is growing. Consider participating.
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And then a number of other questions came up about the public.People are curious
about this. Their interest is not necessarily hostile. In some cases, they ask “I want to
come up. Learn more about it. I want to take pictures of it.” As Bruce mentioned, there
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are different reactions in different systems as to how that should be handled. These are
just some thoughts that came up in the course of our research.
Let me introduce our first speaker. Paul MacMillan is chief of police for the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Transit Police Department in Boston. He
has been with the MBTA for 26 years, has come up through the ranks and is now in
charge. Boston itself is one of the oldest systems in the United States. It is also the
fifth-largest system in the United States, and it was one of first to implement a screening
system. So MacMillan brings a terrific experience to this particular issue. Paul?
PAUL MACMILLAN
Thank you, Brian. Thank you, Bruce. To the extent that Bruce has not outed me, I will
continue to out myself here shortly. Many of those things that you saw up there will
become self-evident as I go through a presentation. I’m going to show this video from
YouTube. It is the video in question that Bruce talked about, and I’m going to show it first,
for a couple of reasons. One, just to see popular expectations in Massachusetts.
So what we said was, “You can film for educational or sight-seeing purposes and stuff,
but if you're filming, regardless of who you are, we have a right to stop you and ask you
what you're doing and why you’re filming.”
In the video here, you’ll see that this individual came down to film, and they mentioned
we have a plain-clothes person observing the security inspection, and he saw this
person filming, and then he engaged him, and there's a term we use, and it’s a police
term. It’s called FIO. It's just a police term and I'll use it—FIO. It’s field interview and
observation. But we take the information down and talk to the individual.
So I’m going to lead off with this (video plays). This is from YouTube; and a very good
description of a program, by the way. Very accurate! It's not a very good quality video,
but you get the point.
So this gentleman is part of a group and I got a letter from him. I called him and and he
refused to answer my phone call. He left his phone number and his email account, and I
tried to write to him, to engage him, and he wouldn’t write back. He sent the letter to the
governor and they referred it to me to answer him.
And then another woman—they were all tied in together—wrote to the governor, and we
had to write back on what grounds we have to do these things. So it’s not a particularly
large group.
Just a little bit about the MBTA. It is the fifth-largest system in the country, carrying 1.2
million a day. We are multi-modal and use light rail, commuter rail, bus, heavy rail, and
ferry services We started screening back during the Democratic National Convention
(DNC). The Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee along with others took us to
court, and we won that case, though on very specific grounds. Because of the DNC, and
because at that time we were only selecting everybody who was going to the event on
the train, taking them off and searching them, the court allowed it. The decision was
silent on the random inspections we're doing now; yet we haven’t yet been challenged.
But the New York case dealt with that.
After a period of time, after the DNC, we stopped doing the inspections. And then, after
a period of time, and after the New York case was settled and New York became the
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trend setter, we started inspections back up again in October of 2006, and we’ve done
about 1,100 to date. We do a number of them per day, four or five days a week. As the
YouTube slide indicates, we are supported by Homeland Security money for most of
them, but not all of them. The funding from DHS says you can use this money to
supplement a program you're already running. We were already running a program, so
we're using that money just to do more of them.
There are three officers, one sergeant and an Explosive Detection Unit (EDU) member
who has a bomb dog, and we have a plain-clothes officer that observes it. We do post
these signs that were in the video, and we've screened 84,000 passengers. In the back
there, by the way, is our policy and the card we hand out. I’m going to get into the
sequential thing in a minute. Whether they have a bag or a carryon or not, that number
comes up, and we hand them a card that says, “Had you been carrying an item, you
would have been screened.” And they’re allowed to just go on their way. So it keeps the
sequential number going.
Inspections take place outside the fare gates. The signs you saw are there. The
inspection sequence is random, with frequencies raised according to the threat. We
haven’t had a raised threat yet.
We are the only agency that uses the computerized random-numbering system.
Let’s say a refusal takes place—”I don’t want to be screened.” We respond, “Thank you.
You can’t ride the T at this station today. You need to go somewhere else.” Now that
person can walk five blocks and get on the T. Referring to Brian’s point, this is a
disruption of whatever was going to happen; maybe we pick up on that. Of if they’re
doing some re-planning, they may realize they just don’t know where we're going to be,
which is why we use a random inspection sequence and choose stations randomly.
Within that context, stations are picked based on volume and also based on the patterns
that have been used in past bombings.
Again, the inspection takes about 12 seconds—realistically maybe they take a little bit
more. I think the guy on YouTube said it was about 20 seconds—I assume that he
thought he must have observed it. But it’s not an inconvenience. We swab the outside
of the package, put it through the explosive trace detection equipment that I’ll show here
in a minute, and then it goes through. It’s a quick reading and then the passenger is on
his or her way. It’s not intrusive at all.
Our screenings differ from others that open bags, which are “searches.” We’re very
careful to say these are “inspections.” They’re not searches. People write in and say,
“You illegally searched me.” We did not. We swabbed the outside of your bag, we did not
search your bag; we did not search your purse.
We have a protocol. If you get a hit, ask simple clearance questions. You know, we ask
the obvious questions—”Is this your bag?” We ask them for some ID if it comes up.
A lot of these problems we had early on with the explosive trace detection equipment we
have since solved with the manufacturer. They’ve done some fine tuning of the
machines, and we’re not getting the number of positive readings that they had before, for
example, for lawn or garden fertilizer, or skin care products. Skin cream was a big hit for
a while. If that happens, we ask a typical baggage clearance question: “Has anyone else
placed anything in this bag?”
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That will trigger an FIO. We’ll get his or her information and document that. We document
everybody we check by race and sex, so that we can look at the random numbers to
make sure that there is not some pattern that develops in the random system that
predicts who it is we’re checking, or that there is some kind of bias in the system. It
obviously isn’t there. We haven't seen it, but we do record all of that.
After the past threat, where the intelligence community developed information that
terrorists were going to attack certain critical infrastructures, we incorporated what we
call “critical infrastructure inspections.” We have several critical infrastructures in Boston.
We talked about a lot of measures, but we never implemented any of them.
But what we’re going to do if that threat becomes real—an elevated threat, or a specific
threat about our critical infrastructure—is that we’re going to implement more aggressive
searches. We haven’t done it yet, as the threat level hasn’t been raised. It’s going to be
interesting to see if we ever have to conduct these more intensive critical infrastructure
inspections.
We use explosive trace detection equipment. They're set up for it. While they can be set
up to detect drugs we don’t use them for that. That’s specifically in the policy. We do not
test for drugs. There are civil liberties claims that, “They're really checking for drugs.
That’s what they’re doing.” We do not. The machine is not calibrated for drugs
whatsoever. And we’re looking to get some more machines. The explosive trace
detection equipment we have now is portable but are not as portable as we would like.
There’s the machine. We take it out every day, set up at a station, and we do have
readings from it. They come from all sorts of things.
We’ve got 119 investigatory readings from these. There was one positive hit for
explosives, from a guy who built model rockets. He verified that was the case—I believe
we went to his house. We asked him to show us his information, and that he did build
model rockets. Voluntarily, he took us to his house and showed us that that’s what he
does for a living, so that’s the only hit involving explosives that we had to actually
investigate.
The other hits were cleared with the questions for nitro or hand sanitizers and the like.
This is what I led off with. This guy was filming these. And we let him. It’s transparent.
We said, “Go ahead and film them.” The terrorists know what they’re getting into. But
they just don’t know when it’s going to happen. So to the extent that people know about
it, yeah, okay. But where it’s going to happen is a different story. But the policy is public.
It’s transparent.
Some advocates get upset, fearing that we’ve somehow done something, strip-searched
them before they can get on the MBTA. They don’t have the same objection in getting on
an airplane or getting into Fenway Park, where they get searched and their bag gets
dumped. For some reason, when they get on the MBTA, they feel that they can’t be
inspected.
Thank you very much. Again, thank you to the Mineta Institute and APTA. The policies
are on the back table. Feel free to take one.
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BRIAN JENKINS
Thank you very much, Chief MacMillan. One point that you made, which I want to
emphasize here, is the issue about doing additional things, or expanding the program if
the threat level goes up. One of the utilities of having a plan in place is having a tested
platform for expansion if necessary. One of the dangerous ways of doing it is to wait for a
higher threat level and then try to design the airplane, build the airplane, and fly the
airplane all at the same time. That gets you into legal trouble. It creates procedural
problems. It doesn't work well.
You might say, “Well, the threat is low right now,” but the idea of having in place a policy,
a platform, a logical approach, some trained people, so that if, heaven forbid, something
were to happen on the system, or a high threat level, we could say, “Well, we’ve got
something here. We’ve got measures, and we can expand this, and we can just as easily
bring it down when the threat is lower.”
Next, we have with us Deputy Chief Ron Masciana from the MTA in New York. Ron has
been with MTA for 25 years, and has a long career in counter-terrorism.MTA is the
biggest system in the world, or close to it. It's a very complex system with trains, buses,
commuter trains, bridges, tunnels, all kinds of interesting things. Having had to deal with
the aftermath of the World Trade Center bombing in '93 and on 9/11, plus the subsequent
plots that have been uncovered, MTA is really on the front lines, and so they have
implemented a program, and Ron's going to talk to us about that right now.
RON MASCIANA
MTA’s programs are very much similar to what Chief MacMillan provided regarding the
randomness and selection. When we talk about “selective” and “random,” we’re talking
about a combination of two processes to provide some level of risk reduction.
What I did want to do this morning briefly is to go over the court case, because think
that's important for not only liability issues, but usually general managers and CEOs
have a fear. They have a fear that when we implement a policy that may affect the public,
that we’ll get the result that we did when the New York Civil Liberties Union filed their
complaint on August 12, 2005. That was based upon the July 22 implementation of the
random screening by NYPD. Of course, we in the MTA followed suit six days after the
complaint was filed, because we were going to respond to the threat.
In my 26 years of experience, I never had to deal with the legal issues, as long as you’re
working in a very clean environment after the fact, because you can’t risk the lives of
human beings based upon what legal issues may arise. But let me just get into the court
case for a moment.
There were two complaints. One was what we call “unreasonable searches.” Keep in
mind that term “unreasonable.” Prior to terrorism, there have been what we called
exceptions to the search rule in New York—vehicle search exceptions, as some of you
may be aware of. There are exceptions when we stop someone. You can do what we call
“frisk.” You stop and frisk or you can frisk individuals if you feel that they have a weapon
on them. And so you can therefore conduct a search. So that’s an exception.
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There’s an exception to the search rule for exigencies. Let’s say you’re standing by a
door and you hear noises in an apartment. Then you hear screaming. You don’t need a
warrant.
So what I’m trying to get to is that the court has recognized that there are certain
circumstances and, in this case, they call it “special needs” to the search provisions.
The second complaint dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment, and that deals with due
process and equal protection under law. In essence, to what Mr. Jenkins said earlier, that
means treating everybody equally; it means that no state should enact or implement a
law that treats their citizens without due process or the equivalent.
There were thirteen witnesses: Eight complainants and five for the defense. There were
two days of testimony on October 31 and November 1. The real issue was that people
felt afraid of the police during the inspections. It wasn't the searches, because two of the
four witnesses that testified that they were searched admitted to the fact that they were
searched at hospitals, at government buildings. They were searched at airports. So it
wasn’t the search and it wasn’t so much what was being conducted. It was who was
conducting the searches.
I don’t know about you folks, but I go to Disney World once every two years. And if you
got to Disney World today, not only is your bag searched, as it would be at any major
stadium that you go to, but they use biometrics. So, in the case of the NYC lawsuit who
does it, not what is being done, is what was being questioned.
Three of the witnesses that testified had a very extensive background in
counter-terrorism. Commissioner Michael A. Sheehan from NYPD who, at that time, was
their counter-terrorism czar, had been an advisor to Clinton, and he had served 35 years
in the military. Also Mike Cohen, who was an advisor to two of the presidents and was
also in the State Department. We had Richard Clarke from Good Harbor Consulting, who
was in the military, and is a very well-known advisor to four presidents.
The basic element of the testimony was that screening was a valuable deterrent, and
that's really what's important here, because it's going to be to deter, it’s going to be to
displace, it’s going to be to disrupt their operations. You want to stop or interrupt the
planning.
The court looked at the level of risk and found it to be real. The court also looked at
certain criteria, but let me explain the criteria, because it's very important to understand
what the court viewed. First, there was notice to the public: very important.
And what was raised earlier, the “see-something/say-something” campaign. I like to call it
not community policing, but rather “passenger policing.” Our community in the
transportation world, they hit the same train car. They hit the same stations. They hit the
same parking lots. They speak with the same people, and they get off at the same spots.
It’s what our cops do. We deploy our cops at the same stations, on the same trains,
because we want them to be ingrained with the community. So why aren’t we taking a
methodology that includes passenger policing? And believe it or not, the more you get
your community involved with you, the more they support what you're going to do, and
the only objection in court came from the New York City civil libertarians.
The second thing is that the search be delimited and not be overly intrusive. They’re
swabbed. But we do open the bags. I do want to see what's inside. In response to
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question number one, it’s not only large packages. Even though our history may tell us
that a bomb at a certain time, whether it be in Mumbai or London or Spain, is at a certain
weight, why take the chances? Let me tell you something. If a one- or two-pound bomb,
regardless of what it is, is activated by a suicide bomber—which, by the way, they’re not
going to stop in the transit station—shutting down the system is going to have a
traumatic effect. The larger device will cause much more casualties, much more
damage, and it will have much more destruction of service. But if the terrorists go after
the psyche, then that’s what you’ve got to be careful of.
Getting back to the original point, we do search inside the package as well as swabbing
the outside. We do use trace detectors. They’re portable. And we turn the machine
setting “off” for drugs. We are not looking for drugs. Our protocols, like yours, are similar.
Don’t go into wallets. Don’t go into purses. And don’t be reading anybody’s material. It’s
that simple. That’s the reason why we have supervision, to ensure that what Mr.
Butterworth talks about in the MTI report takes place. If you haven’t read it, I strongly
urge you to read it if you’re going to implement such a program in your organization, it’s
an excellent guiding document. Certainly if you take what they wrote and published in
February '07, and then compare it with the court case, you just have no idea how close
you were to what the requirements of what the courts indicated. It's phenomenal. You
should be proud of the work that you have done.
Screenings and searches are conducted in the open. It’s not behind a screen, as Chief
MacMillan indicated. It's right there.
It's supervised; it’s random. We record the number in the sergeant’s and in the cop’s
memo books, and then record it at the base. Please, do me a favor. Unless there’s some
set of circumstances that changes it, keep the number the same. It doesn’t have to be
the same for every day. It just has to be the same for the time period that you’re going to
be looking at right now. Because if you change it—
PAUL MACMILLAN
Can I just interject there?
We don’t authorize them to change it. When we went to the random sequential and
computer-generated number, we don't allow anyone to change it. It’s fraught with, “Why
did you change it?” Did you see somebody that you thought, “Oh, okay. Let me change it.
One, two, three, four, five. Okay. Now we can get to that person.” So we don’t allow it.
Now if the threat level were to change during the operation, we’d shoot out another
randomized number that would get more people screened. Sorry, Ron.
RON MASCIANA
That's important stuff.
HEATHER
I have a question about that. What's there to back you up on that? How do you prove
documentation.
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PAUL MACMILLAN
One of the officers uses a hand clicker. Then they record it down on a sheet that said,
“Number eight was selected. There you go.” And he sends it to hand clicker. That’s the
documentation, plus the supervisor there, plus the sheet they fill out.
RON MASCIANA
In the court case, Judge Berman had noted five cases of special need, where sometimes
the governmental interest, rules for public safety, outweigh the privacy interests of an
individual. Keep in mind, unreasonable searches are for an individual wrongdoing, and
this involves a much more broader scope. Let me just read a comment.
“The government’s need to discover such conditions or to prevent their implementation is
sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion of privacy without any measure of
individualized wrongdoing.”
The court case, if you’re interested, is on the web site. I happen to have a copy with me.
It’s a special need, but you have to keep in mind that what we do in baggage screening,
whether it's random or selective, is that all our officers are trained in PATRIOT. If you
don’t use a combination of the two, you’re making a mistake. Don’t rely on one more than
on the other. You can’t say that you’re going to prevent terrorism by just doing random
screening or re-training your officers in selective screening. If you’re going to tell me
today—and I’ve been a police officer for 26 years, and I’ve been using criteria to look for
people who committed crimes—“Well, just do this by number,” you’re going against the
grain of what we’re taught. You’re going against our instincts. You’re going against our
experience. You’re going against our knowledge. That’s why it’s got to be a combination
of the two; but that’s, we understand, in the realm of security.
The word “security” is plastic to most of us. It has a different meaning, but what it really
does is it incorporates many aspects. We’re not here to talk about CCTV, intrusion
detection, access control, public awareness, and all the other things that we do. This is
another tool for the segment of law enforcement to use to prevent, or to deter a terrorist
attack. It’s going to be very hard to prevent any terrorist attack. So I just wanted to make
sure that was crystal clear.
We took this process, and what’s more important is that we regionalized it, and we
regionalized it in a way that we found very beneficial. We call it “Operation MASS.”
MASS means multi-agency super surge. Here's the deal. We know that, God forbid, if
something happens on the MTA, it's going to affect New Jersey Transit. It’s going to
affect the Port Authority. It’s going to affect Amtrak. It’s going to affect the State of
Connecticut. It's going to affect a region.
So we said, “If we drill together, if we tabletop together, why don’t we find a mechanism
to have a coordinated approach?” Then, we do these super surges with uniformed
personnel, we do that together; and when we do explosive detection, we do that
together. So if a customer leaves or employee leaves his or her house, and they drive
right on Long Island Railroad, they’ll see a high uniformed presence. They’ll see
explosive detection being conducted at a certain location. They get off. If they cover New
City Transit, my God, they’re going to see the same scenario. And if they go to Amtrak,
they’re going to see the same scenario. If they go to Penn and take New Jersey trains,
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they’re going to see the same scenario. And this is very important, and we plan these
out. Since July '08, when we started, to July 9 of '09, in one year’s time, we conducted 21
events that incorporated over 5,200 officers.
Here is one more piece that’s very important. We thank the TSA in this regard. Number
one, we use TSA inspectors when we do these multi-agency super surges. We
collaborate with the National Guard. In New York, the National Guard has been deployed
since the day after 9/11, and they’ve been with us ever since, so they’re part of our law
enforcement teams. So when you look at something that we deem is successful, one of
the things you want to do is regionalize it, because any attack on any system in this area
is a regional concern, so you might as well work in a regional arena.
As an aside, though not so much this year, we use transit security grant programs—the
same grants regional transit agencies use to do interoperable communications, to do
interoperable protocols, to pay for some of the events. We thank TSA for paying for what
we call our surges with a high uniform presence to put officers on overtime. If I leave you
with anything, it’s these two thoughts: one, feel comfortable that New York has endorsed
their type of screening; and two, it’s a partnership not with just one other agency, both
many agencies working together in a regional approach.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Brian and I went down to see your screening operation. Your officers set it up for us, and
that was above and beyond the call, so thank you.
BRIAN JENKINS
Thank you very much. Ron, correct me on the legal case. I think one of the contentions
of the plaintiffs in the case was that they said the screening was ineffective, that if you
weren’t screening all passengers, or if you were only screening a small number, that this
would not really have an effect. Is that the case?
RON MASCIANA
That’s absolutely correct, and the judge, in his infinite wisdom, asked the witness about
his background, and he openly admitted he had no expertise in counter-terrorism, while
the defendants had produced five.
BRIAN JENKINS
Right. And I think the court’s actual ruling on that says that the judgment of effectiveness
is beyond the court to decide. The court does not decide effectiveness, and that's
important.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
The judge said that?
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BRIAN JENKINS
… That effectiveness is not within the realm of the court decision.
The exact language will be in the court decision.
PAUL MACMILLAN
But it’s a decision that says, “You can do it. We don’t know if it’s effective or not, but that’s
not our job.”
BRIAN JENKINS
Yes. Judges don’t make decisions on effectiveness.
RON MASCIANA
That’s right.
PAUL MACMILLAN
But we’re not going to rule it out because it’s not effective.
BRIAN JENKINS
Some people have said that the screening programs reduce crime in the area.
RON MASCIANA
I was going to raise that, and I’m sorry I didn’t. If you’re dumb enough and you’re walking
through an area where there are uniformed personnel, you know that there’s a K-9 unit,
and you’re going to be carrying a weapon of any type in your package, or your bags, too
bad. You’re right. It has made an effect out there and it has made an effect on those who
anticipate carrying weapons.
BRIAN JENKINS
I just wanted to raise that issue.
We will have a speaker at kunch, John Sammon. He’s been kind enough to fly over to
Chicago to speak to us
But I think we’ve got time enough for one more presentation before then, and that would
be Ed Phillips from Amtrak. Ed is the Operations Deputy Office of Security for Amtrak. In
fact, he was the individual who designed and who now oversees the random passenger
screening process for Amtrak. Ed comes to us with 35 years of military and civilian
counter-terrorism background, and will talk to us about Amtrak’s work. Ed?
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ED PHILLIPS
It is a pleasure to stand between people and lunch! I’ll be brief. On behalf of Chief John
O’Connor from Amtrak Police, I want to thank APTA and MTI for inviting me to be here
today.
To give you a sense of scale, Amtrak services passenger rail stations today in 46 states.
We don’t move the number of peoples that a normal mass transit agency moves, but
we’re spread from literally one coast to the other, so the challenge is quite extensive, as
you can well imagine.
We’re completely risk-based. Everything we do is about risk management. There’s less
than 350 security and uniformed officers in the Amtrak security population, so even if we
wanted to put one officer a day at each of our sites, we’d run out of people, and then they
work on shifts. Not a lot of folks, so what do you do to address that?
We started our random-screening process based on the plan that New York PD had
already built. We didn’t want to reinvent the wheel and, thanks to NYPD, we copied their
process to the letter after conversations with Commissioner Kelly, Commissioner
Sheehan, and Commissioner Cole. We even went to NYPD, stood with them, wrote
down notes, took their protocols, and copied their language, because we liked what they
did. So we owe New York a debt of gratitude and the system there at MTA.
Our approach is what I would call a combined arms team. The random searching is
nothing more than the device that everything else we do revolves around. In fact, it’s the
least important in terms of physical detection, and in terms of results. In our screening
package we have at counter-surveillance plain-clothes on the outside, when people are
waiting to go in, to get on the train and on the inside as well. They are connected with
communications and they are trained by the same folks who train the CIA and the FBI in
counter-surveillance. It’s primarily tradecraft, but they are beyond BASS. They’re
BASS-plus. Then we have our screening team, uniformed APD (Amtrak Police
Department) officers. They’re organized exactly as you’ve heard before without one
smidgen of difference.
We have at least one K-9 with each of the operations and sometimes we deploy our
tactical guys. These are all former military Special Forces guys or former police SWAT
unit members.
So we’re trying to give a would-be reconnaissance element a visual image. They will see
these guys are serious. They will see all sorts of things going on. They’ll see dogs.
They'll see guns, and they’ll conclude, “Gee, we don’t even know what’s going on, and
tomorrow, they could be anywhere—they could be in Philadelphia. So how are we going
to deal with that? Well, we'll go somewhere else ” That’s the plan.
Let me show you the video that we show every passenger before we do every screening.
We want to be completely open with the passengers, and I might, just as a digression,
state that we’ve received no formal complaints because of this process. We’ve been
doing screening since February 2008, though we’ve had some people that walk up and
complain, other than that, we haven’t had any real problems. And if I can get the
technology to work here, I’ll show you what we show them.
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BRIAN JENKINS
Ed, this is your boarding video?
ED PHILLIPS
Cheap movie. We used everybody to make it. It’s all home-grown productions.
That's what we show our passengers. We’re very up-front about it, and we don’t try to
pull any punches. We completely lay this out.
This is Washington DC’s Union Station. I’m sure many of you are familiar with the
station. We use that same video when we run the operation in New York. We run it in
Philadelphia. We run it in Wilmington, Delaware. We run it in Boston. And we try to hit it
with everything we’ve got at one time.
TSA is a valuable partner for us, particularly Mr. Paul Lennon, and Mr. Tom Farmer. We
take them everywhere we go. Our belief is, as long as we're not doing anything untoward
or stupid, the more people we can put out to be seen the better, in terms of just massing
for the mission of the day. So far, we’ve had zero official complaints, and we've not been
challenged in court, thanks to the NYPD, and thanks to the City of New York, and all the
work that they've done in advance. And that's, in a nutshell, what we're doing with regard
to random screening.
We do use the numbers approach. We pick a number and we follow that. We do believe
that the officers are entitled to conduct questioning—we call it “chatting people up”—if
there is a reasonable suspicion. This is triggered not just by BASS training, but also, if
also if we think for whatever reason there may be a suspicious behavior.
And then lastly, we are now training all of our front-line employees in very basic BASS
using the Logan International Airport model, reshot in Philadelphia 30th Street, as a
means of conveying that to our conductors, our ushers, our ticket sales personnel, and
our on-board service sales people. So we try to get every human asset we can deployed
to detect and deter this event. Sir?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
One of the more unique and interesting features of your program is that if you’ve got
people stationed at different points, and while they’re traveling to where they’re going to
be working the station, they do duties while they’re on the train, right?
ED PHILLIPS
Yes.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
So, they’re actually working on the way to doing the inspection, and then back again. So
you’ve got this very good cross-utilization of manpower.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

54

Panel Session, Part One: Paul MacMillan, Ron Masciana and Ed Phillips

ED PHILLIPS
You know, we have a linear target. For example, in the Northeast Corridor, you're talking
hundreds and hundreds of miles of track, and so if we've got plain-clothes surveillance
guys, we'll put them on a train. We'll run them up to Philly. They're doing the job there.
We'll put a K-9 on the train; the K-9 will sweep the train. By the way, we really like the
vapor-wake dogs. They're almost all black or golden Labs. The passengers love ‘em.
They don’t really scare people, but they love the dogs, and maybe that’s why we haven't
had any complaints. We try to get triple duty out of everybody. If you’re working that day,
and you’re on a train, we’re using you on the train, we’re using you at the station, we’re
going to use you at another station, we’re going to use you all the way back home.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Have you had to increase your staffing in order to be able to accomplish it?
ED PHILLIPS
The answer is “yes and no.” On the APD uniformed police side, no. Chief O’Conner
dedicated 15 personnel on the East Coast as a mobile-team unit, or MTU. They’re
headed up by an inspector. There’s there five-man teams, and each team is headed by a
sergeant. There also are counter-surveillance plains-clothes. Those folks were hired as
additional headcount in 2007, 2008. We have uniformed or security officers for the entire
system.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
I’m sorry. Did you mention if you use supplemental TSA screeners at all?
ED PHILLIPS
We don’t use TSA for screening yet. We use them for physical presence. We will take
them and say, “Okay. We're running a major operation in Union Station. We’d like for you
guys to be out in front.” And they have their BDOs (behavior-detection officers), and
there’s usually a FAM (federal air marshal), or a BDO, or a combination. For example, for
the Winter Olympics in 2010, the TSA is helping us to cover our station between Seattle
and in Bellingham, Washington, with K-9s and BDOs, and we’re running the train
operations to and from, so we couldn’t do it without them. We'd run out of people, and
they come with zero price tag. That's what we do. Thank you very much.
BRIAN JENKINS
Thank you very much, Ed. One other thing, by the way, a utility of screening, is that when
we talk about increasing the security. Surface transportation targets, many of the
operators are understandably reluctant to make major investments in capital equipment,
because that’s expensive, or making committments that require permanent commitments
to increased manpower. The attractiveness of having something that is not a big capital
investment, but that can be expanded and reduced quickly, becomes attractive.
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Almost all of the systems, long before selective screening was put into place, indicated
that they would respond to a heightened threat environment by increasing the presence
of uniformed and plain-clothes in the systems.
If one is increasing the presence of uniformed personnel in a system, you have two
choices between them just being there as guards, observers, which has some utility, or
enhancing their ability to interact with the passengers. Having a screening program is
one way to say we will increase presence, and increase our opportunities to interact.
I testified in the Senate earlier this year on the Mumbai terrorist attack, and was asked by
Senator Lieberman, “Could such an attack occur in the United States?” In the Mumbai
attack, to go to the transportation side of it, there were two shooters, heavily armed,
AK56’s, seven magazines, M-9, a 9-millimeter pistol, two clips, eight to ten hand
grenades, and so Senator Lieberman said, “Could it happen here?”
And I said, “You know, probably we haven’t seen any evidence of something on that
scale in this country, but certainly, we have had experience with single or multiple
shooters in this country, coming into public places, whether it’s universities, or most
recently, the Holocaust Museum, or something like that, yes, certainly.”
I said, however, “The big difference would be the response of local law enforcement,
because in Mumbai, these two shooters were able to continue shooting inside the central
rail terminal in Mumbai for more than an hour. Ultimately they accounted for a third of the
fatalities. More than 56 people died in the Mumbai train station. It would be quite different
in the United States, both in response and in presence.”
That was underscored when Bruce and I were at Penn Station observing an MTA
inspection point in Penn Station, and not just because it was St. Pat’s Day, but there were
MTA doing the inspection. There were NYPD. There were TSA.
There was Armed Amtrak. National Guard. And New Jersey Transit cops were there.
With that kind of presence in the station, had the terrorists taken out a weapon and
started shooting, it would have been over very, very quickly. So I was able to assure the
senator that, “No, it is different here in terms of our ability to respond to shootings.”
UNKNOWN PARTICIPANT
But that can’t be said for many of our stations, because we don’t have the presence.
BRIAN JENKINS
Right. We don’t have it everywhere. And so, again, we come back to this issue of risk
management. Can we protect hundreds and hundreds of remote stations? No. Can we
protect Union Station and Penn Station? Ron?
RON MASCIANA
I guess what I wanted to make a point that uniformed presence doesn’t always
necessitate the need for law enforcement. When the threat is heightened, then, as a
transit operator, I’d be looking at what transit employees, those that we've trained, can
do. You don’t just put uniforms out there. How could you put them at all the gateways?
How can they be by ticket agents? Things like that. So I think, for me, it’s a combination
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of the employees and law enforcement. It’s easy for us: we’ve got 70,000 uniformed
employees. Don’t get me wrong. I’m not trying to hide it; but we do have to seek those
resources that we have, that we can put on reserve.
You know, we do it anyway. Transit agencies do it in preparation for a major storm. We
do it for a natural disaster. Why don’t we just prove it in a more proactive approach? I
guess that's the point.
BRIAN JENKINS
Right. It is five minutes to 12 and, owing to Mr. Sammon’s schedule, what we’re going to
do here is break here. We’ve got a couple more speakers on our panel. So lunch is right
outside. Grab it and bring it back in.

Figure 2 Participants at the APTA Rail Passenger Selective Screening Summit
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BRIAN JENKINS
This afternoon, we have John P. Sammon, who has kindly interrupted his schedule to fly
from Washington to talk to us during our lunch, and he has to get right back. John is the
assistant administrator for Transportation Sector Network Management, and leads an
effort that brings together both public and private networks on not only our surface
transportation systems, but also for aviation and maritime.
He brings to this task a quarter century of experience in the public and private sector.
He’s spent many years in the railroad industry, working with both Conrail and CSX. He’s
going to chat with us today, and be able to answer a few questions, and then we can get
him back to O’Hare, where he can sit on the plane for four hours because of the weather
delays.
JOHN SAMMON
John Sammon delivered a keynote that addressed several issues, including TSA's transit
security strategy, which includes visible deterrence, intrusion and anomaly detection, and
facility hardening. He said that TSA's transit security begins with active security partner
engagement and risk-based security funding.

Figure 3 John P. Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector
Network Management
"TSA's transit grant strategy," he said, "begins with a regional focus. We believe that
effective transit security requires an overall level of regional security. Manhattan cannot
be protected if potential terrorists have free access to transit systems in New Jersey.
TSA has shaped the process, first, to begin with intelligence and intelligence sharing (i.e.
terrorists like to blow up trains, stations, and busses throughout the world and there have
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been numerous transit threats in the U.S.); second, to focus resources on high-risk
agencies, meaning those having high-volume passenger loads in confined and often
underground locations, and a threat/plot history; third, to give priority to low-cost,
high-return security measures such as training, drills, canines, mobile screening, transit
security surges, intrusion detection and access control; and finally, to use regional transit
security working groups to identify, discuss, and determine regional priorities."
Those who are screening rail passenger bags include the New York Police Department,
New Jersey Transit, Metropolitan Transit Authority, Amtrak, and others.
He noted that TSA's transit security strategy evolves through, and is better from,
constant interaction with its security partners and advisors. He said it is designed to
make terrorist attack planning more difficult and their targets less attractive, and it is
designed to make the facilities and systems more secure.
During his presentation, Mr. Sammon also provided some background about why transit
security is important from a risk standpoint. In this sense, risk equals threat, vulnerability,
and consequence. He listed real threat history of bombings and plots around the world;
vulnerability and high consequences of transit; and why transit is difficult to defend.
In its broadest sense, he said, passenger screening involves identifying hostile intent and
capability of unknown passengers. He listed types of screening, including identity
verification, travel document verification, chemical detection, and more.
Rail screening involves canines, he said, as well as random bag searches, ticket checks,
train sweeps, directed patrols, behavioral assessment, and other factors.
Mr. Sammon also discussed the effectiveness of screening methods, including canine
teams, bag searches, remote monitoring, and other elements. He also spoke about the
future uses of cameras. And he provided information about the Department of Homeland
Security passenger screening support, including funding sources.
Issues associated with random screening included methods for ensuring that
passengers' Fourth Amendment rights are protected. Those methods include signs
informing passengers that they and their property is subject to search and that they can
refuse and leave. They also include random searches, a focus on bags and luggage, and
documentation of the search procedure.
Resources are expensive and local transit budgets are tight, he said. So focus must go
to the highest areas of risk, vulnerability, and consequence. In summary, he said, open
and inviting targets are most vulnerable, that random passenger screening can be an
effective deterrent against attacks, and that it's necessary to focus resources on areas
with the highest risk.
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BRIAN JENKINS
A couple of comments quickly before we go on with our next speaker on the panel. As I
mentioned this morning, we are currently engaged in a study of derailing passenger
trains at speed, looking at all of the actual episodes, mainly abroad, where terrorists have
gone after the rails, whether with an explosive device, or by tampering with the rails
themselves, in order to create derailments. We have some episodes from Japan, some
from France, some from Russia, and we’re looking at those to see what were the tactics,
the techniques—how they did it. It’s a big concern in California, too, where we’re going
into a high-speed rail system.
A second comment is that, despite the economic difficulties of the country, in fact, in part
because of the stimulus package, money is going into the renovation or the construction
of new transportation infrastructure, and one of the things that we are focusing on in our
current and future research is that this is really going to present an opportunity to build in
security from the start. What we have been doing thus far is essentially retrofitting. We
build these systems, and then we had to come along later and figure out, “How the hell
do we protect them?”
As we build new systems, or renovate, whether it’s bridges, rail lines or whatever, it gives
us an opportunity to say, “Security is going to be a design criterion.” But, having said that,
how do we actually operationalize that? What principles, what do we actually want them
to put into these designs so that we do this?
That relates to a personal experience. Some years ago, after the bombings of the
American embassies in the Middle East, I was part of a commission called the Embassy
of the Future. I was the only fraud on the commission. All of the others were architects
and engineers, and they tried to get at least one terrorist. They couldn’t, so they got me
as a substitute, and I had to write the threat section. The idea was, “We’re going to build
new embassies; four or five new embassies every year. As we build new embassies,
what do we want in terms of design criteria, construction specs, etc. that will give us
embassies that will be defensible against the likely array of threats we will face looking
out 10, 15, 20 years.”
They said that the life of an embassy is 50 years or more, and they were looking for the
threat to do that. I said, “Looking at the threat 50 years in the future—that’s
entertainment. That’s not research.”
But nonetheless, this is an issue where we are going to be looking at. The particular
issue is how to make security a criterion for renovation and reconstruction of the
transportation infrastructure.
We have mentioned training—about a dozen times so far—and that clearly is a critical
ingredient of making these things work. Therefore, we thought it would be super to have,
as a member of our panel, someone who is deeply involved in training.
Dave Schlesinger has kindly agreed to come here from Oklahoma City, where he is the
course manager at the Transportation Safety Institute, and is involved with a number of
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courses and training efforts focusing on the issues of transportation security. He has a
background as a first responder, and as an operator in transportation systems in Los
Angeles. He brings that experience with him. I should really mention this as a
congratulations. Last year, he received the U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary
“War on Terrorism” medal, so congratulations for that, Dave. Come on up and talk to us
about training.
DAVE SCHLESINGER
Good afternoon. My name is Dave Schlesinger. I’m with the Transportation Safety
Institute, and, on behalf of the U.S. DOT and the Transportation Safety Institute, I’d like
to thank MTI and APTA, and also I’d like to welcome each one of you to this session.
What I’m going to talk about this afternoon is really going to reinforce what you’ve
already heard so far today. You’ve had some subject matter experts, or SMEs, as we call
them, come up here and share their experiences and the issues that they’ve dealt with,
even inside the courtroom, as it pertains to selective screening. So the question that I
have for you, and the challenge that I have for you this afternoon, as you take the
expertise of the deputy chief, or the chief of Amtrak, of our other panelists, of Bruce and
Brian, and you ask yourself the question: These people represent the epitome of
expertise in the subject matter. They are the go-to/end-all when it comes to the expertise.
How do you take that expertise that they have and filter that down to your folks that are
out there doing this work? And that's really what I’m here to talk to you about. And that,
ladies and gentlemen, is training. You’ve got the expertise, but how do you get that
expertise, how do you get those ideas, those ideals, down to the field level? And that is
extremely difficult. That is very, very challenging.
You may have heard there really are three different things, or three ways, that operations
are run in your system, and it doesn’t matter if we’re talking about transit or
FRA-regulated side of the house, any type of industry. You all know that you have your
procedures, you have your training, and then you have what’s actually done in the field.
And never shall the three meet. The closer you are to having the three meet, the better
your operations run. I just kind of throw that out there, and if you really think about that,
you spend a lot of time writing your procedures. You spend time training your staff, but
then how do you pull all that together so that, out there in the field, people are doing what
the paperwork says, and what they were actually trained to do? Does that make sense?
And that is a challenge no matter what industry or what field you work in, where you
come from.
So let me talk briefly. I’m just going to go through a couple slides that are more generic to
who the Transportation Safety Institute is. Then I’ll get into the specific topic of selective
screening.
One of the things that TSI has done in the last four or five years is partner up with TSA. It
was very exciting to hear the keynote address today, because it reinforced a lot of the
work that we’ve done.
Basically what we did was, there was this recognition within TSA that they were bringing
in a number of people to work in their surface transportation security inspector program,
or STSIs, as they’re commonly called. And many of these folks had a railroad
background. Those who came with a railroad background mostly come from the FRA
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side, but a large number of them have a law enforcement-type background that doesn’t
necessarily have a transit involvement. So how do you take those folks and train them,
first of all, so that when they go out on the rail right-of-way, they don’t get hurt, because
that’s always very important. But also, since they know what they’re talking about, and so
they can be conversant with Amtrak, with New York City Transit, with Boston, so on and
so forth, they can speak the language. Because all of us at one point or another have
been audited or met or have been inspected by someone only to realize that person
doesn’t really know what they’re talking about.
We've basically created a program in cooperation with TSA. Before they send their new
surface inspectors out to do their work, they come out to Oklahoma City. There’s a big
FAA center in Oklahoma City called the Mike Monroney Center. They come out there and
they actually do some work with TSA. TSA has an academy there now.
Then they come across the street to the TSI building, and we spend a few weeks with
them, and we actually go through and teach them a class called “Rail Incident
Investigation,” which covers rail basics as well as rail safety, hazmat, and some other
topics. So that’s kind of the partnership that we’ve put together with them, and that was
really what led to the War on Terrorism medal being awarded to us, because it was more
about this work that we’re doing to prepare them to go out and properly defend our
surface transportation network.
So it’s a great partnership that we’ve had with TSA. We have a tremendous amount of
love for TSA in a lot of different ways. We also teach a lot of our classes at transit
agencies, even right here in Chicago. We’re coming out to Chicago in about six months.
We’re going to have a room full of about 30 CTA employees, and we’re going to teach
“Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies,” and the entire class will be funded by a
DHS grant. So that's kind of the other side of how we work very closely with TSA.
Likewise, just for your information, TSI has what we call our TSSP—Transit, Safety and
Security Program—and this is a certificate that’s awarded to people if they complete four
of our courses within a three-year period. People can then take that certification and
actually go to the World Safety Organization and get safety certified by them. A little bit
off the topic of today, but just for your information.
We also work very closely with state safety oversight, and if you’re familiar with 49 CFR,
part 659, what is commonly referred to as State Safety Oversight, we work very closely
with that community. The State Safety Oversight community actually goes through a set
of TSI courses, that also, on the security side, ties into the security plans of the transit
agencies, because we also train them not only on the system safety program plan, but
also on the security plan requirements.
So that’s a bit of a background on TSI. Let me move now, if I may, into talking specifically
about selective screening issues, and you’ve heard again from a number of the
speakers. They’ve talked about having a program standard. They’ve talked about having
some type of guiding document that is used for this activity. And the chief here from
Boston was even kind enough to provide us with a copy of his. But again, what you want
to ask yourself is, “Is the document realistic? Are we training to the document? And are
we actually following it out there in field? Is everyone familiar with it?”
We've talked site selection and signage, and a lot of this has to do with your pre-actual
screening work. In other words, having people go out that know your system, and doing
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an assessment, creating a database, saying “This particular location, because of the
station layout, or the extremely low traffic, or the far outlying area that it’s located in,
we’re not as interested in.” You can do this by doing a priority system or a tracking
system within your database.
Then, of course, we’ve talked a lot today about what? Inspection methodology. And this
is very, very important, because you’ve got to look at the backgrounds and previous
experiences of your folks actually doing the inspection, actually working there and doing
the screening. And what type of background do they have? Where do they hail from? For
the most part, we’re looking at our law enforcement folks, but, as we talked about in the
New York model, we’ve got some involvement by TSA. So if we’ve got these folks over
there, how are they conducting this process? And that’s something you want to look for
and make sure that you train for, and that ties right into courtesy and respect.
You will find that your patrons, your passengers, will be a lot more forgiving, and will give
you a lot more latitude, and will be a lot more cooperative, if they’re treated with courtesy
and respect. And I’m sure each you can think of a time that you, yourself, have been
screened at the airport, and maybe there have been some times that it was such a
positive experience for you, just based on the way that people treated you.
I fly a lot out of Oklahoma City Airport. It’s a smaller airport. And I tell you, the people
there—I mean it's Oklahoma—the people there are so friendly. “Hey, how are you doin’
today? Where are you heading?” They’re conversant with you. They put you at ease.
“Hey, sir, I'm sorry. You know, we need to take your bag and run it back through. There’s
something. We don’t really know what it is. Is there anything in there I should know
about?” They are so wonderful there about that courtesy and that respect, and making
you feel comfortable, and putting your guard down.
And that really goes a long way, which, of course, ties into the next topic, which is what?
“Problem Management.” You’re gonna have problems with some of the folks that you're
trying to screen, for one reason or another, be it on the civil liberty side, be it the person’s
having a bad day. They just got fired from their job. They’re upset about something else.
You’ve got to train your folks on how to actually deal with that, how to manage that, how
to handle that.
And you may have different levels of response that are based on what the person is
doing. If they’re getting physical with your folks, if it’s their language, what are your
responses going to be? Make sure you lay that out in your documentation, and you train
your folks accordingly.
Then we’ve heard a lot this morning about documentation. I really like the idea that we
keep a log, we keep track, where we carefully keep note of what we do. I’m sure many of
you on the FTA side know, and under FTA regulation, FRA regulation, one of the things
we do in our drug and alcohol programs is random drug tests, and many of you have
come across those questions from operating personnel. “Well, I don’t understand. I’ve
been sent for random three times this year, and my buddy down the hall never got sent
once. You don’t like me.” You have to go back and show people it’s based on a random
system. There’s a truly scientifically verified random system. “And it just so happened
that, luck-of-the-draw, yours came out more than someone else.” That tends to be
extremely important.
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So let’s just talk briefly about training approaches. Again, when you talk about training,
there are different ways of doing it, and one of the approaches that many agencies take
is a “train-the-trainer.” So you get your core group together, you get your core
constituents together that actually run the program, or that are out there, which is the
supervisors, or the leads, if you will, and you train those folks. You bring them up to
speed.
Now most agencies are really good about doing that. I can tell you from experience that
where the ball is dropped is in selecting those people and making sure that they can
adequately train. Can’t we all agree that we’ve been to training sessions that you’ve
walked out of, signed a piece of paper, but really not learned anything? It’s not just about
grabbing a group of folks and saying, “Look, I’m deputizing you to run this training for
me.” It’s making sure that those folks actually know how to train, know how to speak in
public, are able to run a training session. And I can tell you from experience, when I was
in Los Angeles, we had an incident that one of our responsibilities was training the entire
operating division on handling hazardous materials. As an operating person, I was
mandated to attend this training.
And the room was set up a lot like this. The person got up in front of the class, and said,
“Okay. I’m going to do a four-hour training today on this hazardous materials issue.” The
gentleman got up here and stood like this for four hours, and excuse me for putting my
back to you, but I was sitting behind him, and around me was a whole bunch of third-shift
track inspectors. And what do you think all those guys did? They went to sleep.
But at the end of the four-hour session, there was a roster passed around, and they
signed. And it went in their training file that they had attended that class. So just be
careful. Don’t always think that training is a silver bullet, because it has to be done
correctly.
Then what you want to do is you want to test. You took the training. How did you do?
Test. You want to follow up in 30 days. You want to follow up in 60 days and then you
want to do random monitoring. So if you the selective screening set up, and you’ve
trained the person, and you’ve tested the person, every now and then, the chief shows
up, the deputy chief shows up, a lieutenant shows up. “Hey, guys! How are we doing?
How’s everything going?” And they ask. And we love to do this on the safety and the
security side of transit and of rail.
When I go out and work with agencies, I’ll walk in at three in the morning. They’ll tell me,
“Okay. What time do you want to do your first check?” “Hey, let’s do it at three in the
morning on Sunday. Let’s go out and see what the track crew is doing at three in the
morning. Let’s show up at the control center at three in the morning and see what the
staff is actually up to, because, really, the manager is not there.” It might just be a
controller that’s running the whole place, and what is really going on? So just keep that in
mind. With your training, you need to do your training, but you also need to follow up. It’s
a continuous process. It’s really a circle. It’s like painting a bridge. You start in San
Francisco on the Golden Gate, and by the time you get to the other side, you've gotta
start back over. And that’s how you have to look at training—follow-up, evaluations,
testing, and so forth.
When you talk about front-line training, so you can take your train-the-trainer, you could
take your brand-new “expert” now, and your person can go out and train others. You can
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also do front-line training. You could bring in an organization, TSI, someone else, a
consultant, and they could do some of that training for you, with your front-line
employees, when you do it in-house with your instructors that have been properly
trained. They typically will refer to that as some type of front-line training.
And then there’s your management awareness training. You want your managers
throughout your system to know what’s going on, and to know what the issues are. So, in
the context of law enforcement, our sworn personnel that is doing this actual inspection
work for us—what type of training have we done for the station managers, for the transit
mangers, for the transportation managers? How aware are they of these programs? If
there’s an incident, do they know what’s involved? Do they know how to respond?
So I know many times we tend to focus on or we delineate between what type of training
our sworn personnel get, what type of training our civilian personnel get, and a lot of
times, it’s really important that we work together and we talk to each other. Just like drills.
We talked about it this morning. How important it is that, when we have an incident, we
all know each other. We’ve worked together. We’ve drilled together. Our radios can talk
to each other. We know each other by face. I always say, you know, “If you’re in the line
of command, you don’t want to be the person showing up and meeting your counterpart
at the scene of the incident.” And, as much as some of the recent transit incidents have
been tragic, one of the good things about them has been the effectiveness of our
emergency response. And it doesn’t matter whose incident you look at. Recently, for the
most part, we’ve done very well as an industry responding. So that model, those drills
and all that, can tie into your selective screening, where you have that preparedness and
everyone’s on board, and they have the same information. They understand what’s
being done.
Just really wrapping this up for you, you can do some role playing. Many times, people
kind of chuckle at role playing. They kind of say, “Well, what's that? You know, why would
I want to do that?” But the power behind role playing is that it allows people to actually
see what can happen. If you actually set up a simulated screening, and you get some
people with a bit of a personality and charisma, and say, “Look. I want you to show up,
and I want you to be the problem person being screened.” Then see how your staff deal
with that, and actually role play that out. That’s a lot of what we do in our classes. If you
come to a weeklong rail incident investigation class, I’m going to take a train and actually
derail it in the yard in a controlled condition using re-rail equipment. I’m going to bring
you in as a student and let you investigate it. So it’s not just about sitting in the
classroom. It’s about, “Let’s go out in the field and actually get our hands dirty.”
And then, from there, your continue training. I kind of touched on this already. You need a
feedback system. For example, if you’re getting comments from your patrons or from
your staff that there’s a particular problem, that you can go back, and through your
training, address that problem.
You know, maybe we need to do a little bit better on the courtesy and respect side.
Because of some of the phone calls we’re getting, and we have some on our Web site,
people are saying, “You know, I don’t really have a problem with this whole selective
screening thing, but, I’ll tell you. If these guys are just a little more polite to me, it would it
a little easier.” And you assess it, and you say, “You know, that’s a valid concern. I think
we should respond to that.”
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So you feed that back into your training system and you go out and you do that with
training. Maybe there’s a regulatory change, there’s another court case. Something
comes down regulatory-wise. There is a decision made in another jurisdiction and you
want to bring your staff back up to that level. So that is the idea behind the current
training that you go back and you refresh, you reinforce. You make sure that people are
doing what you taught them.
So that pretty much wraps it up for my session. I hope this has been helpful for you. The
thing I want to really emphasize is, please remember that the expertise that you have
running this program and managing this program has to be trained and taken down to
the operational level so that everyone that’s out there getting their hands dirty would do it
the same way you would want it done if you were actually there. Any questions that I can
address?
BRIAN JENKINS
It may be in some of these future court challenges that the documentation of the training,
the nature of the training, becomes part of the defense of the thing. Not only that they are
trained people, but here is what they have received as part of that training process. So
there needs to be something beyond just signing a roster, something that documents the
training and contents of the course, I would imagine.
DAVE SCHLESINGER
Sure. I entirely agree with you. And a good model to look at is OSHA. On the
occupational side, on the industrial safety side, if I have an OSHA inspector walk in, and
he says, “Okay. I see Chief Teybourne over there wearing his particular personal sets of
equipment or doing a particular role. Has the chief been trained in this?”
And I say, “Oh, yeah. Sure he has.” If I can’t produce the documentation, it never
happened. And that’s the approach that we take. Generally, the way you want to
document training is, that you do want to have a sign-in sheet and a roster, and you want
to keep a subject-based record of what trainings occurred. Then you also want to keep it
on the individual level. So at a given date and time, I know what training the chief has
been through, but then I can also pull up his training record at my agency and elsewhere
and tie that all together, including the document. That is supported by having copies of
what you actually trained for. It’s not just a piece of paper that I signed—here are the
actual materials. Here is the instructor guide. Here is the PowerPoint. This is the test that
he took. We brought him back in six months later and we did recomp training.
BRIAN JENKINS
Great. Thank you very much.
DAVE SCHLESINGER
My pleasure.
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Figure 1 Jesus Ojeda, Security Coordinator, Southern California Regional Rail
Authority, and Dave Schlesinger, Course Manager, Transportion Safety Institute
BRIAN JENKINS
There is a perception that screening is something that cities in the East do, that we don’t
do this on the West Coast, certainly not in California, but that’s not correct.There is an
exception to that, and the exception is Los Angeles. And although California’s
geography, especially the social and political geography, is greatly different from our
cities in the East, nonetheless, we have screening going on at LA, at LA Metro and
Metrolink. We thought it would be a great idea to include in our panel someone who
could talk to us about that screening program and those experiences, in implementing
that, and so we’ve invited Jesus Ojeda, who is the Security Coordinator for Southern
California Regional Rail Authority. They operate MetroLink, which is our rail system.
Admittedly, it’s not as big as MTA in New York. One is still heavily dependent upon
automobiles in Southern California, but it is an expanding system, and it’s getting better.
It’s getting more elaborate, and, the social and political geography is very, very different.
Jesus Ojeda is responsible for the security of the employees, the passengers, and the
system itself, and he brings 12 years’ of commuter rail experience. He has been in
charge of this, and working with the police—actually the sheriff’s department—in
implementing this particular system. Jesus, you have the honor of being the last panel
member.
JESUS OJEDA
All right. I have a quick presentation here.Thank you very much for the introduction and I
also thank you for having us here to talk about our random baggage-screen program that
we have implemented in Los Angeles. What I’d like to do is, before we actually get to the
program itself, I'd like to give you just a quick background of our system, how many trains
we operate and the entire lines that we run on.
As you know, MetroLink is a commuter rail system. We operate on seven different lines.
We cover six Southern California counties. We have 55 stations throughout the system.
Six of those lines, six of the seven lines, work their way into Los Angeles Union Station,
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which we’ll get a chance to talk about that, and how difficult it is to do a random baggage
search at that station.
We have about 38 different police jurisdictions that we travel through. We do provide
training for all of those police departments along with the fire departments.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
And mind you, those are counties, not states, for you East Coasters.
JESUS OJEDA
That’s right, very challenging. So how do we get through the random baggage-search
screenings? Prior to getting to that, let me talk a little bit about our training with
passengers and our front-line employees.
A lot of you know my boss, Ed Peterson. After the Madrid bombings, he was
brainstorming about ways of informing our passengers to stay alert, stay vigilant. So we
had a brainstorming session and we came up with the “iWatch” campaign.
Basically, what we did, we added posters on every passenger car. In addition to that, we
needed to educate the passengers, so we developed a brochure that came along with
the poster. On that brochure, we have specific information for the passengers—what to
look for, if they see any type of suspicious activity, or suspicious individuals, to please
report it. They report it to the conductor or there is a toll-free number on that brochure.
That was back in 2005.
We allowed a couple of years to go by. In 2007 we said, “You know what? It’s time to do
something a little bit different. Kind of refresh the passengers’ memories and not to let
the passengers put their guards down.” So we came up with a small card, the size of a
business card, and on that card is information to reinforce the message to the
passengers to alert keep and stay vigilant.
On our system, our passengers are very territorial. I think earlier we heard someone
indicate that they get on that car, every single time. They sit in the same seats, and
sometimes they travel in groups. It’s the same thing with our passengers. If they see
someone new next to them, first of all, they give them the dirty eye, beause that’s
somebody’s seat, which is good. You develop that friendship, that bond, and when they
see new passengers, they keep an eye on ‘em. So that’s always good.
Well, it’s also critical to train our front-line employees on system security. So what we did,
we looked into having NTI assist us with training our front-line employees and
contractors. There is a great training tool that they have: The “System Security
Awareness” training. We talked about “train-the-trainer” course. So we grabbed the core
group of individuals, and we trained them through the “train-the-trainers” course and after
that, we trained over 700 of our front-line employees.
At Metrolink, we have a contract with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. They
are responsible for the safety of our passengers, employees and the security of our
equipment and right-of-way. In early 2007, the sheriffs department looked into what New
York was doing with the baggage searches, and it’s something that they went out to and
obtained as much information as possible. They brought it back home and asked if we
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wanted to implement the random searches. And our CEO, David Solow, is very
supportive of any new type of safety or security campaigns.
This is how we initiated the random baggage-search program. In June of 2008, which is
exactly a year ago, we started a pilot program. Because we weren’t quite sure how it was
going to work out, we had a line with specific signs—“This is only a drill or test. If you
wish to participate in the random search, stay on this line. If you don’t wish to participate,
here’s a second line. Just go straight to the train.”
We did start with the stations that had a manageable number of passengers, just
because we wanted to get a good feel of how the program was going to work. I can tell
you, we didn’t tackle Union Station right off the bat because that’s a beast. We do have a
list of all the stations, and we estimate how many passengers travel through those
stations daily, and that’s how we’re able to determine our random number.
It is very important that we stick to that number. I think a lot of us expressed some
concerns earlier today.
Who participates? Well, we have participation from a number of entities. We have, of
course, the MetroLink Sheriffs. They’re the ones that have control of the search.
However, we do have a very good relationship with TSA. We have two inspectors
assigned to the MetroLink system. We are in constant communication. We talk at least
two times a week. We’ve asked our inspectors to provide the following individuals to
assist with the random-search program: the FAMs, the federal air marshals, the behavior
detection officers, and also the screeners at the airport. So we always get good
participation from TSA.
In addition to TSA and the other entities I mentioned, we are in the process of training the
local authorities. So when we decided to search at a station, we invite the local
authorities to come out and work with us. The local authorities have an opportunity to get
familiar with the Metrolink system. In case there is an incident, we would like to call them
up, pick up the phone, and say, “Hey, can you help us out?” We can’t be at every location
at the same time. So that is our goal.
Now, one of the very key components of this program is training. Before we allow them to
be on our system, we have actually set up a class. We call it “"Railroad 101,” a
two-and-a-half-hour course which is discussing how to be safe around the train, tracks,
and stations
If the passenger happens to be chosen because of particular number we decided for that
day, they will be searched. If the dog alerts on a bag, then we will find out who this
individual is. The deputies will do their job—determine if they have a permit to carry that
weapon, and if they check out, then they let them go.
Here are more team members—The one on the left is Amor. The one in the middle is
Debra. And Tom. He’s out of control. I swear, they feed ‘em sugar for lunch, because he’s
all over the place. He’s a great dog, though.
So this is how we got started with the random baggage-search program. In June of 2008,
which is exactly a year ago, we started a pilot program where we had two different lines.
Because we weren’t quite sure how it was going to work out, we had a line with specific
signs—“This is only a drill or test. If you wish to participate, stay on this line. If you don’t
wish to participate, here’s a second line. Just go straight to the train.”
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Well, what happened on your first day we have this exercise? Some knucklehead, he
sees the sign—he stayed on the participating line and so we opened up his bag, and he
had drugs in there. So it’s one of those things. We do have to take action even though we
are not looking for drugs. We are looking for explosive devices or anything that can harm
our passengers or our equipment.
We did take the stations that had the least number of passengers, just because we
wanted to get a good feel of how the program was going to work. I can tell you, we didn’t
tackle Union Station right off the bat, because that’s a beast. We do have a list of all the
stations, and we estimate how many passengers travel through those stations daily, and
that’s how we’re able to determine our random number.
Earlier, most of the panelists were talking about that random number. That number is
assigned by our unit commander or the sergeant in charge of the operation the morning
of. So when we get together at the briefing, that sergeant or that unit commander comes
up with that number. We look at the number of passengers at that station, and we come
up with a number three, a five, or a ten. It depends on the volume of passengers. It is
very important that we stick to that number. I think a lot of us expressed some concerns
earlier today.
BRIAN JENKINS
Can I just clarify that? On the TSA participation, they assign some Federal Air Marshals
and TSA screeners to participate with you in this process?
JESUS OJEDA
Yes. Every baggage search.
BRIAN JENKINS
That's out of their budget?
JESUS OJEDA
Correct.
BRIAN JENKINS
You're not compensating them?
JESUS OJEDA
It depends on where we are. Remember, we cover six Southern California Counties, so if
we’re in Orange County, we’ll get the FAMs from Orange County, or the John Wayne
Airport screeners, or Ontario or LAX. So we get ‘em from all over the place.
Now one of the very key components of this is training, cross-training. Before we allow
them to be on our system, we have actually set up a class. We call it “Railroad 101,”
where we actually go to them at the airports, or wherever they are, and we give ‘em this
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two-and-a-half-hour course. Basically, we get into issues of how to be safe around the
train—the train, the tracks, and what-have-you.
Another benefit of having TSA team up with us is that they have been able to send a few
of our people to some of their training classes, such as the behavior detection classes,
and that’s been great for us. We have some of our detectives, including myself. I’ve gone
through one of those classes, and it’s a really good team effort that we have going on.
Once we select the number in the morning—as you can see in some of the pictures, the
passengers are being pulled to the side. Even though not every bag gets searched, what
we do is we have the K-9 or K-9s, sometimes two, standing right at the checkpoint. So
even if I walk around and it's not my number, I still have to walk through these dogs, and
I get checked, whether I know it or not. So it does work out where the dogs are sniffing
the bags as they’re going through.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
How do you deal with people that have concealed-weapons permits? It could be an
undercover cop. Could be a courier that’s carrying diamonds.
JESUS OJEDA
If the dog gets a hit, then we will find out who this individual is.The deputies will do their
job. Find out if they have a permit to carry that weapon, and if they check out, then they
let 'em go. In most cases, if you’re not in law enforcement (we ask that)—actually, you
can carry a weapon on the train. However, they have to be separated from each other,
the weapons and the ammunition, in two different cases, and they have to be locked.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
And California is not amenable to CC weapons. There are very few jurisdictions or
counties in the State of California that really want to issue CC weapons. So really what
you find, particularly with the problem in downtown Los Angeles, particularly Union
Station—
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
But it’s like somebody who has a “carry concealed weapon” permit, and he’s a civilian.
We have a few counties and sheriffs that will issue permits to particular buddies, friends,
or even precious metals vendors or jewelers, to carry a concealed weapon because of
the nature of their job. But they’re very rare. What happens into a metropolitan area like
downtown, is right in the station, you have LAPD headquarters. You have the Federal
Building. You have the LA County Sheriff’s Transit Services Bureau right at Union
Station, and every state and regulatory agency is allowed to carry a gun, so it can be
quite challenging in Union Station.
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JESUS OJEDA
If it's law enforcement, we encourage them to ride our trains. As a matter of fact, law
enforcement can ride our trains for free as long as they are prepared to act in case of an
emergency.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
If you are training a dog to sniff bags, and you’re training the dogs to clear a cleared
area, it's very different to train a dog to detect explosive trace except in the presence of a
main vapor-wake. They're all different applications.
RON MASCIANA
You're right. I agree with this. You have to look at it from his perspective. We bring the
ATF in to test our folks. We do trace, but we also want to make sure that the dogs are
lively most of the time. We won't use a dog in that application. I'll just let you know that,
because there can be confusion. I mean if the instrumentality says “yes,” and the dog
says, “no,” and vice-versa, now you’ve put yourself into that other catch 22. Forget legal
challenges, because you’re gonna act. “I've been hit!” Or the lack of hit.
SAM LOTT
Well, the question was brought up, or a statement was brought up, that said that these
dogs—when these dogs go bad, they go bad fast. I've never had any visibility on that.
Can you expand on that just a little bit?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
The dog stops working sometimes after 25, 30 minutes. In order to keep its handler
happy, it will pretend to alert. It will start keying in on the handler. The dog is smarter than
you think. The dog is watching their handler.
So now comes the test. The handler knows the test is coming. And the handler starts
giving body language that says, “Okay. You’re going to hit on this bag.” The dog isn’t
reading the explosive. The dog is reading the handler. When the guy comes through, the
dog sits. “Good dog!”
JESUS OJEDA
And you’re absolutely right. I think they have the 20 to 25 minute really solid work that the
dogs can put into the screening.
After that, you've got to take him out and bring the other dog in, and that's what we do.
We rotate the dogs. The ones that have been working, we'll send them out to give 'em a
break.
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PAUL MACMILLAN
I’m just going to be very honest about it. APTA is an excellent group to do standards;
however, this is a special dog. And, to be honest with you, you've got organizations like
ATF, who are better suited to develop the standards in cooperation with TSA than an
organization that really doesn’t have that level of expertise.
JESUS OJEDA
Well, we’ve had an issue brought up in this particular slide. I was at one of these
screenings. Once the train pulls into the station, we hold the train. We have each dog
board different passenger cars. Our trains consist anywhere from three to six cars, so the
dogs board the train. They search the lower level, the upper level, and, in one incident,
we had a dog that had a hit, and the deputies weren’t quite sure because the dog
hesitated a bit, maybe he was tired, or I’m not sure what the case was. So in that case,
we brought a second dog in, and the second dog did the hit. But we still talked to the
individual, or the sheriffs talked to the individual, and it ended up being that I think
someone talked about makeup and hand sanitizers. Those are scents that the dogs pick
up.
PAUL MACMILLAN
The TATPs, triacetone and triphosphate, has become a big issue here to train the dogs in
it, obviously, and that's been some of the hits that we’ve experienced, even with the
technology. There’s nitrates and musk. There’s acetone and Skin so Soft, so that’s been
the issue so far.
JESUS OJEDA
Right. So we ended up talking to the passenger and she was very cooperative. Opened
up the bag and, as a matter of fact, she was having a good time petting the dog. There
was nothing there.
All right. Next slide. We do have signage at the stations. These signs are pretty big-size
signs that tell passengers what they’re comin’ up to, whether it’s the search. We also
have the definition of what is considered to be a “bag” or a briefcase, a purse, anything
where someone can conceal some type of explosive device. Yes?
GEORGE LONG
Taking into account the diversity of the Los Angeles area, especially across the different
regions of the LA area, is there a standard program for how to hang the signage in
different languages?
JESUS OJEDA
We talked about that, and then where do you stop? You have English and then you have
Spanish. You have Vietnamese, Chinese.
At this point, we only have signs in English.
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That issue, I was going to toss around, having signs in Spanish, but we haven’t got to
that point.
In conclusion, we have positive feedback from passengers. I would say 99.9 percent of
the passengers are very happy. We’ve had two complaints. However, these are not
formal complaints. These are people that were just complaining to the deputies at the
site, but up to now, we have not received a formal complaint from anyone.
Over 90 percent of the passengers are very excited. “Thank you for doing this.” “Thank
you for keeping us safe.”
It's a long time coming.
Nothing but great comments from the passengers. In terms of our passenger-education
campaign, we have received several calls from passengers saying that they saw
somebody on the train with a weapon, and then it happens to be an off-duty police
officer. They call in, they call that number, and it goes directly into our operations center.
We dispatch the deputies. We stop the train at the next station, check the guy out, and if
he's clean, then we continue with the operation.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
I hadn’t thought about the unique advantage of having a train system where everyone
tends to grab the same seat, and save the seat. I mean that’s unbelievable.
PAUL MACMILLAN
Commuter rail is a completely different animal than other rapid transit.
Our commuter rail, if someone's in the wrong seat, man, that’s—
RON MASCIANA
Oh, yeah. You'll get the seat, yeah.
You can catch ‘em playing poker together. They’re watching the same movie or DVD. It's
more like a party.
JESUS OJEDA
They have parties on the train.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
Bring their own food. It’s a moving neighborhood.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
I was just recalling from personal experience, I used to ride the system, and amid the
ship, what I call the high-level part, and to admit that I used to sit with about six people,
and it was always pretty much the same people. And then, maybe Thursday, you tell ‘em,
“I’m off tomorrow. So I’ll see you all on Monday,” because, for the most part, if you work a
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schedule, you meet at a certain time, and you're going to hop on at a certain time. People
are creatures of habit, and I found, when I got to know these people, and there was
actually a few cases when we got together outside work, and, we’d go to a movie or
something like that. It becomes this little community on wheels.
JESUS OJEDA
Well, we’ve had weddings come out of there, too.
PAUL MACMILLAN
We had a wedding on our commuter rail train about a month ago. They got married on
the train.
JESUS OJEDA
We've had that, too.
PAUL MACMILLAN
Yeah, because they met on the train.
JESUS OJEDA
It’s definitely more of a community. They come together, and they could spot a new
person, a new passenger, or an outsider, that doesn’t get along with their group.
We’ve got of calls or complaints to the conductor saying that this guy’s getting up, going
to the bathroom, leaving his stuff behind. So it’s working. We’re doing something right
there.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today.
BRIAN JENKINS
Thank you very much for the excellent presentation.
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BRIAN JENKINS
This was a very valuable day for all of us. These are the serious people talking about this
particular issue. We really will have an impact with the record of today’s discussion, and
the report, where we will capture all of this, and that will be issued. Donna, do you have
something?
DONNA MAURILLO
I just wanted to emphasize that these proceedings are put down in the record, and then
uploaded on MTI’s Web site, and then we promote that publication with press releases
throughout the country.
BRIAN JENKINS
What kind of hits do we get?
DONNA MAURILLO
We track which documents are downloaded, and very often we get hundreds of
downloads for a particular document. So we do know that the information that you give
out here actually is getting into the hands of people who may not have been able to
attend the conference at all.
BRIAN JENKINS
We do have a tremendous number of downloads on some of our studies, so an edited
transcript of this workshop will be available, and it’s been extremely, extremely valuable.
Now some of you have transparent programs, and put it out there, that is terrific; and, in
some cases where there are Web sites or things on YouTube or whatever. But we will put
out a carefully-vetted but nonetheless a record that captures the essence of what we had
here today, and apart from downloads, it will automatically go to a number of offices in
the Department of Transportation. It goes to a number of places on the Hill. And so it
does get the readership. Any other comments or questions? Yeah, go ahead.
RON MASCIANA
Brian, I thought this workshop was excellent and even though the topic may have been
random or selective screening, it's the different approaches, the different ideas of how
people implement them. At the end, a paradigm comes out, you know, standards for the
development of K-9 explosive teams. Things like that.
And I'm certain that throughout the process of reviewing the material today, there will be
other, you know, futuristic-type actions that need to be taken. So I'm thrilled to be here,
and I thank you very much. I mean that.
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BRIAN JENKINS
Thank you. And, by the way, on the issue of the dogs, we weren’t beating up on you,
Jesus.
JESUS OJEDA
Oh, no.
BRIAN JENKINS
We had this dog issue in our mind. This is an issue, and we came across it in the course
of the research as an issue; but just given the amount of time this morning—in fact, I
skipped some of the slides that had this whole dog issue, and so it is an issue.
And it’s something we’ve got to figure out, because there is no question that the use of
dogs is a great idea, that we’re using them in a variety of ways. There are issues of
training, standards, reactions, testing, and all of that, and that’s something, if we’re going
to defend these systems, and if we're going to defend interventions based upon those
reactions—
JESUS OJEDA
It’s got to be right.
BRIAN JENKINS
It’s got to be right. We can’t get blown out of the water by the bad guys, either, because
we make a mistake on a false negative, which would be worse, or we screw up, and we
get blown out of a court room.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
One thing about the last slide, on Suspicious Activity Reporting, or SAR. You’re going to
get one other potential opportunity to express an interest in the National SAR Program of
DHS. Police started with legacy systems and now they can use them in a shared DHS
SAR space. DHS has collected some specific suspicious activities reported, responses
and results as well. I know this is DHS’s program but it would be very interesting to have
Transit police create their own part of SAR. That’s in the last slide we provided.
BRIAN JENKINS
Yes, that’s another issue, in terms of exploiting suspicious-activity reporting on this, and
we've had some successes on that.
JESUS OJEDA
A point of clarification. Is that the local SAR reporting?
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Opportunities for Discussion (con’t)
3.

Suspicious Activity Reporting:
–

National SAR initiative is improving national data reporting, analysis,
and dissemination
•

Local legacy systems can perform regional and national searches of SAR
data
Data includes indicators, responses, results
Examples of State and local police now participating: Miami-Dade,
NYSIC, Virginia Fusion Center
Some data involves trains and buses
Terrorist and criminal cases have been opened

•
•
•
•

–

Transit agency PDs could create a national SAR “shared space”
dedicated to transit indicators and responses (e.g., e.g., left luggage,
suspicious picture taking)
Aviation Example:

–
•
•
•
•

–

Spike in left luggage at LAX. Bags blown up at great expense
FAMS, LAX police, and LAPD looked at data
Airline baggage charges caused spike.
Solution: Bins for passengers to leave empty, open bags in,

Program is growing. Consider participating.
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UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
Yeah, but what it allows you to do is in the most case, we will look at SAR as they already
do, for the local transit, the local police. This is a legacy system, and to place into the
national space, properly sanitized SAR, which are available then for all the transit
operators. And what that allows is for you or DHS or anyone else to start moving trains.
JESUS OJEDA
Well, some transit operators just check in on security.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Right. Some of them may not be able to interface. All I’m saying is that whether it’s MTA
or NYPD, DHS is very interested in having the mass transit community start to place
SAR information in the national space, so that everyone can start looking at it.
RON MASCIANA
How is that integrated with the current reporting requirements of the 1580? The 1580 of
TSA requires that you’re to report all suspicious activity to their TSOC (Transportation
Security Operations Center).
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BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
I know what the TSOC does, and I don’t know how it is going to be integrated with the
SAR program. But I would say they’re separate, because of the name.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
The 1580 reports are currently omitted, because they’re talking about the rail security
rule that TSA passed late last year.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
This summer.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Right. So people are still working on it, and it’s currently limited to a communication from
an agency to TSA; it’s not so much assimilated throughout industry.
RON MASCIANA
Well, it does.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
It does. It comes right back.
RON MASCIANA
You get the emails from TSA.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
Right. It’s Tisdale’s stuff.
RON MASCIANA
Right, exactly.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
It's a potential duplicative reporting that needs to get resolved. I’m going to bring that up
with the SAR program manager.
RON MASCIANA
No. It may be deployed to where that integration gives you the more global view, which is
what I was hoping to drive at, and that’s to keep it segmented, because it only helps us
when we start developing patterns and trends, to do the analysis.
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GREG HULL
But keep in mind that TSA also has a transportation sector-wide daily report that they put
out, and I think part of the problem that I’m having with TSA and DSH and all those other
agencies, is you get so much information that you have to know what is important, what
is actionable. There’s a discernment you have to go through, and it’s a very difficult thing
to do unless you really have the time and personnel, never mind, on top of the
international role.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
Then what’s the content? What’s the context as it relates to your industry, you know?
Because it’s so what, this happened. So what? Maybe it’s huge and you miss it, but you
don’t have the content.
BRIAN JENKINS
Well, one of the objectives on this, apart from sorting out how this goes, is that if you
observe, and it’s suspicious activity, this peculiar activity, whatever that is, that you will be
able to come into the systems, as I understand it, and say, “Okay. Any other systems, do
we have any history of this elsewhere? Where we see this same set of circumstances
going on?”
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
Exactly.
BRIAN JENKINS
What do we make of that? I mean, you know, “Is the circus in town?”
RON MASCIANA
Well, you’re absolutely correct. About 14 months ago, we had a scenario where, on two
separate days, empty briefcases were left in New York City. Well, guess what happened
on Monday? Three suitcases at the base of the Brooklyn Bridge.
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
Right. So you’re doing it locally already.
RON MASCIANA
Yeah, but I think that the people in California are experiencing something similar. And
they don’t know what is going on in New York, and New York doesn’t know what is
happening in California. Maybe we need to identify the pattern and see where it all ties
in.
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BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
And the SAR program manager very much wants it, to see that the transit community
does this at a national level.
RON MASCIANA
What’s he done? What’s he done toward that end?
BRUCE BUTTERWORTH
He’s just starting to try and get people involved.
GREG HULL
He's talking to the ISAC and talking to us.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
He needs to talk to Paul Lennon and get the peer-advisory group involved.
BRIAN JENKINS
By the way, on that point, we can also get some historical case-study data in there, as
well, because of what you just mentioned. We know now, looking back, at the run-up to
the 2006 Mumbai bombing attacks, there was increase in number of left suitcases just
filled with old clothes that were found left on the carriages. What is clear, in retrospect, is
they were testing the system. They were checking the system. If we had that kind of
historical stuff in there, people could say, “Well, wait a minute. This was an indicator of a
dry run,” or something like that. Data like that would be really valuable.
UNNAMED PARTICIPANT
That's the difference between information and intelligence.
RON MASCIANA
The biggest injury factor of people over 40 is ego. You can control that. It doesn't matter
who has the better mousetrap. Let's just find out what the better mousetrap is. You don't
want people to be parochial, because you tend to lose the intelligence. But you're
absolutely right. It defines information and Intel.
BRIAN JENKINS
I want to thank all of our panelists for coming and joining us here in Chicago. I appreciate
your taking time out of your schedules and participating in this workshop.
As one of the authors of this forthcoming report, I can tell you that, in addition to allowing
us the privilege of looking at your operations, a lot of the comments made here, and
questions raised, are going to affect our forthcoming study about rail passenger selective
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screening. That is really an enormous help for all of us in this. Make sure you download
copies of the report from www.transweb.mti.sjsu.edu, and, with that, thank you very
much, and safe journeys back home.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AG
APD
APTA
ATF
BDO
BTD
CCTV
CFR
CNN
CTA
DHS
DNC
EDU
EDT
FAM
FIO
FTA
IC
IED
IRA
ISAC
GATO
JTPS
JTTF
MASS
MBTA
MTA
MTI
MTU
NSA
NTI
NTSCOE
OSHA
OMB
PATH
SAR
SME
S&T
STSI
TATPs
TSA
TSI
TSSP

Attorney General
Amtrak Police Department
American Public Transportation Association
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
Behavior Detection Officers
Business Travel Department
Closed Circuit Television
Code of Federal Regulations
Cable News Network
Chicago Transit Authority
Department of Homeland Security
Democratic National Convention
Explosive Detection Unit
Explosive Trace Detection
Federal Air Marshals
Field Interview and Observation
Federal Transit Administration
Intelligence Community
Improvised Explosive Device
Irish Republican Army
Information-Sharing Analysis Center
Global Air Traffic Operations
Joint Practical Planning System
Joint Terrorism Task Force
Multi-agency Super Surge
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Mineta Transportation Institute
Mobile Team Unit
National Security Agency
National Transit Institute
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Office of Management and Budget
Port Authority of New York
Suspicious Action Report
Subject Matter Experts
Science and Technology
Surface Transportation Security Inspector
Triacetone and Triphosphate
Transportation Security Administration
Transportation Safety Institute
Transit, Safety and Security Program
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Assistant Administrator for Transportation Sector Network Management
Transportation Security Administration

As the assistant administrator for Transportation Sector Network Management, John P.
Sammon leads a unified effort to protect and secure, through public-private networks,
our nation’s intermodal transportation systems, including aviation, rail, transit, maritime,
cargo, highway and energy pipelines.
Mr. Sammon brings more than 25 years of transportation experience to his position,
including management of customer networks for railroads, motor carriers, ocean carriers,
petrochemical manufacturers, and ports and other public agencies.Most recently, Mr.
Sammon was the principal partner in a software venture, e-Carload. Before that, he
spent many years in the railroad industry, working for both Conrail and CSX. As senior
vice president at CSX he was responsible for a $3.5 billion industrial products business
unit with a staff of 500. Mr. Sammon has extensive experience with business
development, operations and managing change.
Mr. Sammon has a Bachelor of Science in economics from Bucknell University and a
Masters of Science in economics from Texas A&M University.
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Director, Mineta Transportation Institute’s National Transportation Security Center
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Michael Jenkins works with government agencies, international organizations and
multinational corporations. He is the director of the National Transportation Security
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From 1989-1998, Mr. Jenkins was deputy chairman of Kroll Associates, an international
investigative and consulting firm. Before that, he was chairman of RAND’s Political
Science Department where, from 1972–1989, he also directed RAND’s research on
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Mr. Jenkins has a B.A. in fine arts and a masters degree in history, both from UCLA. He
studied at the University of Guanajuato, Mexico and in the Department of Humanities at
the University of San Carlos, Guatemala where he was a Fulbright Fellow and received a
second fellowship from the Organization of American States.
Commissioned in the infantry at the age of 19, Mr. Jenkins became a paratrooper and
ultimately a captain in the Green Berets. He is a decorated combat veteran having
served in the Seventh Special Forces Group in the Dominican Republic during the
American intervention, and later as a member of the Fifth Special Forces Group in
Vietnam (1966–1967). He returned to Vietnam on a special assignment in 1968 to serve
as a member of the Long Range Planning Task Group; he remained with the Group until
the end of 1969, receiving the Department of the Army’s highest award for his service.
Mr. Jenkins returned to Vietnam on third special assignment in 1971.
In 1983, Mr. Jenkins served as an advisor to the Long Commission, convened to
examine the circumstances and response to the bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in
Lebanon. In 1984, he assisted the Inman Panel in examining the security of American
diplomatic facilities abroad. In 1985–1986, he served as a member of the Committee of
the Embassy of the Future, which established new guidelines for the construction of U.S.
diplomatic posts. In 1989, Mr. Jenkins served as an advisor to the national commission
established to review terrorist threats following the bombing of PanAm 103. In 1993, Mr.
Jenkins served as a member of the team contracted by the New Jersey-New York Port
Authority to review threats and develop new security measures for the World Trade
Center following the February bombing.
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In 1996, President Clinton appointed Mr. Jenkins to be a member of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. From 1999–2000, he served as an advisor
to the National Commission on Terrorism and since 2000, he has served as a member of
the U.S. Comptroller General’s Advisory Board. Mr. Jenkins also is the Director of the
National Transportation Security Center at the Mineta Transportation Institute, and since
1997 has directed the institute’s continuing research on protecting surface transportation
against terrorist attacks.
Mr. Jenkins serves as a Special Advisor to the International Chamber of Commerce and
a member of the advisory board of the ICC’s investigative arm, the Commercial Crime
Services. Over the years, Mr. Jenkins also has served as a consultant to or carried out
assignments for a number of government agencies including the Department of
Homeland Security. As part of its international project to create a global strategy to
combat terrorism, the Club of Madrid in 2004 appointed Mr. Jenkins to lead the
international working group on the role of intelligence.
Mr. Jenkins is the author of International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, the editor
and co-author of Terrorism and Personal Protection, co-editor and co-author of Aviation
Terrorism and Security, and a co-author of The Fall of South Vietnam. His latest books
are Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves and Will
Terrorists Go Nuclear? He is also the author of numerous articles, book chapters, and
published research reports on conflict and crime.
Bruce R. Butterworth
Transportation Security Consultant, Research Associate
Mineta Transportation Institute’s National Transportation Security Center of
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Bruce Butterworth has had a distinguished government career working at congressional,
senior policy and operational levels. From 1975–1980, as a professional staff member
for the House Government Operations Committee, he ran investigations and hearings on
many transportation safety issues, particularly in aviation. He spent 11 years in the
Department of Transportation, eight of them in the Office of the Secretary. He managed
negotiations on air and maritime services in the GATT (now WTO), chaired US
delegations to United Nations Committees, dealt with transport and aviation issues
related to border inspections, and was part of the response to Pan Am 103. Mr.
Butterworth held two executive posts in aviation security and in both worked closely with
Congress as the informal but primary liaison. He was Director of Policy and Planning
(l991–1995), establishing strategic, long-term and contingency plans, and federal rules.
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As Director of Operations (l995–2000) he was responsible for federal air marshals,
hijacking response, and 900 field agents; he worked hard to improve security and the
performance of security measures by U.S. airports here and by U.S. airlines everywhere.
He ran the FAA's aviation command center successfully managing the resolution of
hijackings and security emergencies. He launched a successful program of dangerous
goods regulation and cargo security after the 1995 ValuJet crash, oversaw the
conversion of the air marshal program to a full-time program with high standards, was a
key player in the response to the ValuJet and TWA 800 accidents, and was a frequent
media spokesperson. He worked closely with the Congress, the National Security
Council staff, the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and authorities of
other nations.
He was an associate director at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (2000–
2003), responsible for security and building operations. He designed and implemented a
“best practice” procedure to deal with mail possibly containing anthrax powder; and
developed and conducted new, comprehensive emergency planning and exercises.
Between January 2003 and September 2007, he was one of two Deputy Directors in a
1,300 person Engineering Directorate at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center,
managing workforce planning, budgeting, and human capital management for complex
robotics space missions, substantially reducing overhead and improving workplace
safety there. Besides having helped DHS in information sharing, he is a research
associate with the Mineta Transportation Institute. He has produced a peer-reviewed
report on the security risks created by the highway transportation of hazardous materials
for the State of California, and is updating prior work on selective screening practices in
the rail environment for DHS, along with Brian Michael Jenkins.
He co-authored, along with Mr. Jenkins, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers (MTI
Report 06-07), a monograph entitled published by the Mineta Transportation Institute in
February 2007. He also co-authored Keeping Bombs off Planes: Securing Air Cargo,
Aviation's Soft Underbelly, a May 2007 study with PJ Crowley, Senior Fellow and Director
of Homeland Security at the Center for American Progress. In February 2009 he
published with Mr. Jenkins “A campaign the Secretary must win,” an opinion piece on
information-sharing.
Mr. Butterworth was awarded a Master of Science degree from the London School of
Economics in 1974 and a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of the Pacific in
1972. He was a California State Scholar and a Rotary Foundation Fellow. He received
numerous special achievement and performance awards.
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Paul MacMillan
Chief of Police
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Transit Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts

Paul MacMillan is Chief of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)
Transit Police Department in Boston. He has earned more than 26 years of experience in
transit policing and is the first chief to rise through the ranks to this position.
The MBTA, the transit authority for greater Boston, is the fifth largest transit system in the
country and carries more than 1.2 million passengers each day. It has been conducting
random security inspections of passengers since October 2007. Chief MacMillan will
discuss the process, provide copies of the MBTA’s policy, and discuss the MBTA’s
experience with random security inspections.

Ronald J. Masciana
Deputy Chief of Police
Metropolitan Transit Authority, New York, New York

In January 1984, Ronald J. Masciana joined the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s
Police Department. In the 25 years since, he has risen through the department, holding
various supervisory and command positions until his current position as the Deputy Chief
of Police assigned to the Office of Security.
Deputy Chief Masciana has spearheaded the design and development of a counter
terrorism prevention and response program to address personnel and infrastructure
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security requirements. Working with transportation agency partners, he coordinated the
development and implementation of the Security Threat Alert Protocols that coincides
with the U.S. Homeland Security Colored Alert System.
He also implemented the MTA Office of Security’s permanent and pilot programs for
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive detection and mitigation as well
as laser detection. He established the MTA’s first Blue Ribbon Panel of Experts in
support of these initiatives.
During his tenure, Deputy Chief Masciana coordinated and implemented emergency
management planning and disaster recovery programs in conjunction with the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center, N.Y.C. Police Department Counter Terrorism Unit,
U.S. Department Homeland Security, U. S. Department of Transportation, and other
federal agencies. Collaborating with rail/subway/bus operating agencies, he developed
the MTA's threat vulnerability and risk assessments, establishing a unified methodology
for identifying and prioritizing counter-terrorism infrastructure mitigation efforts.
Deputy Chief Masciana is a graduate from the FBI National Academy and holds a
Bachelor of Science Degree from Dowling College.
He is a member of the American Public Transportation Association, co-chair of the
American National Security Institute–Homeland Security Standards Panel and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Sector Review Panel. He is affiliated
with the Transit Cooperative Research Group, the American Public Transportation
Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, FBI-National Academy
Associates, and the American Society of Industrial Security.
Jesus Ojeda
Security Coordinator
Southern California Regional Rail Authority, Operators of Metrolink

As the Security Coordinator for Metrolink, Jesus Ojeda is responsible for the security of
employees, passengers and the system. He works closely with security personnel and
law enforcement to protect the agency's assets and critical infrastructures.
Mr. Ojeda has more than 12 years of commuter railroad experience, including five years
of transit experience with the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
Mr. Ojeda is also a member of the Surface Transportation Security Committee,
composed of local, state and federal law enforcement branches.
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Mr. Ed Phillips is the operations deputy for Amtrak’s Office of Security. He designed and
oversees Amtrak’s random passenger screening process, as well as all corporate
counter-terrorism activities. He authored the security strategy Amtrak practices today,
which follows a risk-based, holistic remediation paradigm. He is a key player in Amtrak’s
federal transportation security grant program project prioritization and implementation.
Mr. Phillips has 35 years of military and civilian counter-terrorism experience, including
service with Army Special Forces, and in government and private industry.
Dave Schlesinger
Course Manager
Transportation Safety Institute, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Dave Schlesinger is a Course Manager with the Transportation Safety Institute. He
manages courses that include Transit Rail Incident Investigation, Advanced Rail Incident
Investigation, Transit Rail System Safety, Transit Rail Safety and Security Audit,
Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Safety Evaluations of Alternative Fuels,
Facilities and Equipment, and Alternative Fuel Cylinder Inspection. In addition, Mr.
Schlesinger is a scheduled presenter at conferences for organizations including the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA), The Mineta Transportation Institute
(MTI), and the South West Transit Association (SWTA).
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In 2008, Mr. Schlesinger received the U.S. Department of Transportation Secretarial War
on Terrorism Medal and, as part of the Transit Safety and Security Division, the DOT
Secretarial Team Award.
Mr. Schlesinger graduated from the University of Southern California and first worked in
rail for Ansaldo Breda, managing the acceptance of the Metro Red Line heavy rail
vehicles. On this project, which realized the on-time delivery of 74 new trains, he was
responsible for acceptance, quality, safety, and training.
LA Metro’s Quality Assurance Rail department then hired him to investigate rail and
industrial incidents and to ensure that new rail vehicles were in compliance with safety
guidelines, agency specifications, and applicable regulations. This included service as
QA Project Manager, reporting directly to Metro’s CEO, for the procurement of 52 light
rail vehicles. He also worked on a number of special projects, such as diesel fuel use
underground, rail vehicle component reverse engineering, and modifications and safety
certification of hi-rail inspection vehicles.
From QA, he moved to Metro’s fleet services department, where he oversaw the
maintenance of revenue vehicles, safety, adherence to OSHA regulations, hazardous
material management, emergency preparedness, and incident response and
investigation. He was also responsible for ensuring compliance with Metro’s System
Safety Program Plan (SSPP), including participating in internal and external safety and
security audits.
Mr. Schlesinger also has significant volunteer experience as the Second in Command for
the City of LA, Crisis Response Team. He led more than 100 intervention specialists who
responded to incidents involving death, serious injury or a violent crime. He was
responsible for training, call out, and managing the group, including moving staff on
scene within 30 minutes for an average of 50 incidents a month.
As a responder, he has worked incidents and/or helped debrief with as many as 25
fatalities and more than 100 injuries. He has responded to more than 75 call outs,
managed teams at more than 500 call outs, and led the team’s participation in disaster
drills, including those for the rail systems and LAX airport. He participated in emergency
preparedness conferences and trainings and has helped create city-wide emergency
response plans. In 2004, he received the City of Los Angeles Volunteer of the Year
award, which included recognition by President George W. Bush.
As a Toastmaster, in the public speaking organization of the same name, he has
received numerous awards at major regional speech competitions, both in California and
Oklahoma.
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